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I. INTRODUCTION
In his classic 1837 literary masterpiece, Oliver Twist,' Charles
Dickens powerfully portrayed the difficult life of a young boy trying
to survive amidst the wretchedness and despair of Victorian Lon-
don's dark underside. The novel was set against the backdrop of the
Poor Laws Amendment Act of 1834,2 which forced both working and
nonworking poor in need of public assistance to live in conditions of
deplorable misery in special institutions called workhouses, where
the government could support them more cheaply than outside.3 The
Poor Laws also provided that fathers had no legal obligation to sup-
port their illegitimate children, placing financial responsibility for
these children solely on their mothers.4 In Oliver Twist, Dickens
was, above all, expressing his view that protecting the innocent chil-
dren was society's most important endeavor. 5 Over 150 years later
and on a different continent, Congress continues to struggle with the
1 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Fred Kaplan ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1993) (1846). Oliver Twist first appeared as a serial in the weekly magazine, Bent-
ley's Miscellany, from 1837 to 1839. It was published as a book in 1838, 1839, and
again in 1840. The third edition of Oliver Twist was published in 1841 and then, in
1846, Dickens completed a substantially revised edition of the book that "repre-
sents the author's final wishes in regard to the text." Fred Kaplan, Preface to
DICKENS, supra at x.
2 Poor Laws Amendment Act of 1834, 4 & 5 Will. 4, ch. 76 (Eng.). For a
comprehensive examination of the policies underlying the Poor Laws, see 10
SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW
POLICY 1-20 (1963).
3 See Poor Laws Amendment Act of 1834, 4 & 5 Will. 4, ch. 76, § 15 (Eng.).
For a discussion of the history of the establishment of workhouses under the Poor
Laws, see 14 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 222-24
(A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds. 1976).
4 See Poor Laws Amendment Act of 1834, 4 & 5 Will. 4, ch. 76, §§ 69, 72
(Eng.); see also DICKENS, supra note 1, at 367-69, 372.
5 Fred Kaplan, Preface to DICKENS, supra note 1, at x.
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same issue of how a civilized society can best protect families from
the hardships and despair of welfare.
In 1994, Congress attempted to address one aspect of this vast
problem when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. 7 A
primary policy objective of this sweeping bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion was to protect spouses 8 and children from being forced onto wel-
fare or into bankruptcy by ensuring that debtors seeking bankruptcy
relief nevertheless satisfied their alimony and child support obliga-
tions.9 Yet, as this article demonstrates, Congress failed miserably in
its attempt to achieve this lofty goal. Why is this so?
6 See, e.g., Gertrude Himmelfarb, Welfare as a Moral Problem, 19 HARv.
J.L. PUB. POL'Y 685 passim (1996).
7 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994); see also The Honorable Margaret D. McGarity, Family Law Provisions of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, May 16, 1995, at Al,
Al:
The plight of vast numbers of American children entitled to but
not receiving adequate support by noncustodial parents has not
failed to attract the attention of Congress. The economic disad-
vantage experienced by some former spouses of bankruptcy
debtors has likewise created an impetus for change. Congress's
response to these perceived inequities was part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994.8 This article's references to a "spouse" of the debtor are intended to include
both current spouses, who are separated from the debtor and entitled to receive
support in connection with a separation agreement, and former spouses, who are
either divorced or permanently separated from the debtor and are entitled to receive
alimony, maintenance, or support under a divorce decree or separate maintenance
agreement. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). In addition,
although empirical evidence suggests that women are far more often the recipients
of support payments than men, and thus are more likely to find themselves in the
role of creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, see, e.g., Peter C. Alexander, Divorce
and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on Women as Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 351, 368 (1994), this article attempts to discuss the
issues raised herein in gender-neutral language because both the issues and the
resolution of them remain the same irrespective of the gender of the debtor and
creditor in bankruptcy. It should be noted, however, that several sources discussed
in this article have not adopted a similar gender-neutral position.
9 See 140 CONG. REc. H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter) ("I have heard heartbreaking stories from single parents who ... find
themselves forced to fight for their rightful level of child support. With no other
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One of the philosophical underpinnings of federal legislation
is that it is the product of careful deliberation and debate between the
two houses of Congress.10 Yet no bankruptcy scholar or practitioner
would argue that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was the prod-
uct of such a process. Instead, the Act resulted from haste and only
superficial debate. 1 In fact, the House and Senate together deliber-
ated for less than three minutes on this major piece of bankruptcy
reform legislation. 12 It is no wonder, then, that the Act created more
uncertainty than it answered.
The Act began as Senate Bill 540,13 introduced by Senator
Howell Heflin, Chair of the Committee on Courts and Administrative
recourse, these families often turn to welfare to provide the child support the absent
parent ought to be responsible for. H.R. 5116 takes an important first step in break-
ing this tragic cycle by strengthening current bankruptcy law and enforcing tougher
measures for child support and alimony collection."); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-
835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363 (The Act "is in-
tended to provide greater protection for alimony, maintenance, and support obliga-
tions owing to a spouse, former spouse or child of a debtor in bankruptcy. The
Committee believes that a debtor should not use the protection of a bankruptcy
filing in order to avoid legitimate marital and child support obligations.").
10 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.
REv. 1503, 1527 (1990) ("[T]he deliberative process offers time for reflection,
exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming preferences. Public
debate among those of equal status and eloquence thus ultimately leads to realiza-
tion of the common good."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison);
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 68-70 (1997).
1 One commentator described the legislation's enactment as "a model of
haste." Charles E. Falk, Tax Aspects and Strategies After the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, 36 TAx MGMT. MEMORANDUM 103, 103 (1995). Another noted bank-
ruptcy scholar argued that the legislation should not be enacted because "Congress
needs to have a more thorough and deliberate process to study bankruptcy reform."
Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 12 (1994) (statement of
Kenneth N. Klee, Chairman of the Legislation Committee of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference).
12 See The Honorable V. Michael Brigner, Domestic Relations Corner-D.R.
Lawyers Face the 1994 Bankruptcy Code Amendments, DAYTON B. BRIEFS, Sept.
1995, at 15, 15.
13 S. 540, 103d Cong. (1993).
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Practice, on March 10, 1993.14 The Senate Judiciary Committee then
held two days of hearings on Senate Bill 540, on March 31, 1993,
and August 2, 1993.15 The bill was brought before the entire Senate
on April 21, 1994, and was passed by unanimous voice vote. 16 Sen-
ate Bill 540 was then sent to the House of Representatives, where it
languished for over five months.' 7
Finally, on September 28, 1994, just one week before the end
of the congressional session, the chair of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Jack Brooks, together with two other ranking House mem-
bers, introduced their own version of Senate Bill 540, designated as
House Bill 5116.18 This major bankruptcy reform bill was referred to
the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law on the morn-
ing of September 28th, marked up, and voted out of committee that
same afternoon.' 9 That evening, staff from both the House and Sen-
ate Judiciary Committees reached a compromise on the two versions
14 See 139 CONG. REc. S2609 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (introduction of S. 540
by Sen. Heflin). For a comprehensive discussion of the history underlying the
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see Phillip S. Corwin, Legislative
History of the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994," NORTON BANKR. LAW ADVISER,
Dec. 1994, at 1, 2.
15 See The Need for Supplemental Permanent Injunctions in Bankruptcy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993:
Hearing on S. 540 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); see also Corwin, supra note
14, at 2.
16 See 140 CONG. REc. S4666 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994); The Honorable Roger
M. Whelan, "Yes Virginia, There Is a Santa Claus" (and a New Bankruptcy Bill):
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 401 (1994);
see also H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 68 (1995).
17 On August 17, 1994, the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
of the House Judiciary Committee conducted a single hearing relating to bank-
ruptcy reform generally. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. (1994); Whelan, supra note 16, at 401; Corwin, supra note 14, at 2. See
also H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 68 (1995).
18 See H.R. 5116, 103d Cong. (1994); see also 140 CONG. REc. H10006 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1994) (introduction of H.R. 5116 by Reps. Brooks, Fish, and Synar).
19 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-883, at 68; see also 140 CONG. REC. D 1155 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1994).
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of the bankruptcy bill, and this compromise bill was unanimously
voted out of the full House Judiciary Committee early on Thursday,
September 29th, less than one day after the proposed legislation was
first considered by a House committee. On the weekend following
this initial committee action, a flurry of activity on the compromise
bill ensued between key members of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. This compromise of House Bill 5116 was brought to
22the House floor on October 4th, and passed by unanimous voice
vote on October 5th, under suspension of formal rules.23 The Senate
then passed House Bill 5116 by unanimous consent on October 6,
1994, and the bill was signed into law by President Clinton on Oc-
tober 22, 1994.25
What is clear from this brief history of the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 is that standard procedures were
continually ignored during the legislative process. For example, the
House failed to hold a single hearing on House Bill 5116, an omis-
sion unheard of for such a significant piece of legislation.2 6 In addi-
20 See H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 68; see also 140 CONG. REC. DI 168 (daily
ed. Sept. 29, 1994).
21 See Corwin, supra note 14, at 2; see also Bankruptcy Reform: Reform Bill
Passes House Judiciary, Brooks Urges Action Before Adjournment, BNA BANKR.
L. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1.
22 See 140 CONG. REc. H10752-73 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
23 See 140 CONG. REc. H10917 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994); see also H.R. REP.
No. 103-883, at 68.
24 See 140 CONG. REC. S14461 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994); see also 140 CONG.
REC. HI 1203 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (announcing passage of H.R. 5116 by Sen-
ate).
25 See President's Statement on Signing of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 2129 (Oct. 31, 1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3372-1. One commentator has referred to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994 as "the October surprise." David G. Hicks, The October Surprise: The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994-An Analysis of Title I-The Commercial Issues,
29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 501 (1996).
26 See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Prob-
lem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527, 535 (1994) ('The legislative system
is characterized by the opportunity for deliberation, including discussion and de-
bate, time for reflection on and refinement of one's position, and exposure to the
views and concerns of others."); Eule, supra note 10 , at 1555 ("Legislative hear-
ings and the testimony of various interest groups widen the legislator's horizon.")
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tion, it suspended formal rules when it brought the bill to the House
floor for a final vote. 27 Most glaring, perhaps, is the absence of a
conference committee formally established to resolve the differences
between the two bills and report the compromises back to both
chambers through a conference report. Instead, the bill was precon-
ferenced so that it could be considered and enacted before the regular
session ended.28 As a result of these blatant irregularities in the proc-
ess, there is an alarming paucity of legislative history, including no
conference committee report, on this major piece of bankruptcy re-
form legislation. 29 As discussed below, this article takes the position
that these procedural irregularities contributed to a significant inter-
nal conflict between the tax and support provisions in the legislation,
a conflict that threatens to undermine a primary policy objective of
the Act itself.
One of the hallmarks of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
was its concerted effort to afford greater protection to alimony, main-
tenance, and child support claimants in an individual debtor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 30  To that end, the Act amended eight separate
subsections of the Bankruptcy Code. 31 A cornerstone of the legisla-
27 See H.R. REP. No. 103-883, at 68.
28 See Corwin, supra note 14, at 2.
29 Some commentators have heralded the legislation as the most sweeping
reform measure since the inception of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Hicks, su-
pra note 25, at 501 (citing Janet A. Flaccus, A Potpourri of Bankruptcy Changes:
1994 Bankruptcy Amendments, 47 ARK. L. REv. 817, 817 (1994)); Ned W. Wax-
man, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 311-12 (1995).
30 See 140 Cong. Rec. S4511 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) ("Title III [affords] .. .greater protection for children and former
spouses who are beneficiaries of child support or alimony payments."); see also
140 CONG. REc. H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Slaughter)
("H.R.5116 gives added protection to child support and alimony payments in the
event of a bankruptcy filing."); TERESA A. SULLrVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 179 (1994) ("In 1994, in response to a crescendo of
complaints about the effects of bankruptcy on divorced women and their children,
Congress passed substantial reforms designed to improve the legal position of
spouses and children in bankruptcy.") . Alimony, maintenance, and child support
claims will be referred to collectively as "support claims" throughout this article.
31 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat.
4106, 4132-34 (1994), which amended the following provisions: 11 U.S.C. §
101(12A) (defining the term "debt for child support"); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(a)(i)
2001]
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tion was the provision elevating support obligations above tax claims
by treating support as a seventh priority claim in a debtor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding.32 This amendment, which has been called "the
most sweeping change in bankruptcy law, as it relates to domestic
relations, since passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898, ' 3
relegated tax claims to eighty priority status, to be paid only after
support obligations were satisfied in full.34 As Congress indicated in
the Act's legislative history, "[b]y closing loopholes in the bank-
ruptcy code that allow debtors to avoid these [support] obligations,
we are sending a strong message that we will no longer tolerate
deadbeat parents."
35
In a separate section of the 1994 Act, Congress added a seem-
ingly unrelated provision to the Bankruptcy Code. This amendment
allows the federal government to assess income taxes against a debtor
(allowing the establishment of paternity without violating the automatic stay); 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (permitting a spouse to establish or modify an order for
alimony, maintenance, or support); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (treating support obliga-
tions as seventh priority claims in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding); 11 U.S.C. §
522(f)(1)(A) (stating that a debtor cannot avoid a judicial lien securing an alimony,
maintenance, or support debt); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (treating property settlement
obligations as nondischargeable debts under certain circumstances); 11 U.S.C. §
523(c)(1) (providing that creditors attempting to have their property settlement
obligations deemed nondischargeable must seek a determination from the bank-
ruptcy court); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (establishing that support payments cannot be
avoided as preferential transfers).
32 See McGarity, supra note 7, at All ("This new Section 507(a)(7) requires
payment of such [support] debts ahead of priority taxes."); Kathy M. Kristof, What
the New Bankruptcy Law Means to You: Reform Act Creates a New Debt Category
That Can't Be Erased and Protects Ex-Spouses, Children, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23,
1994, at C3 (the Act "gives payment of child support and alimony greater 'prior-
ity,' allowing these debts to be paid even before the Internal Revenue Service can
collect past-due taxes.").
33 Claude R. Bowles Jr., Matrimonial Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, FAIR$HARE, Mar. 1995, at 3, 3.
34 See McGarity, supra note 7, at Al 1; see also infra notes 102-06 and accom-
panying text.
35 Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Com-
mercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 10 (1994) (state-
ment of Rep. Schroeder); see also 130 CONG. REC. 13072 (1984) (statement of
Sen. Exon) ("The number of parents who ignore their child support obligations is a
national disgrace.").
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in bankruptcy 36 and issue a notice of tax deficiency and demand for
payment to the debtor37 without violating the Code's automatic stay
provisions. 38 The stated purpose underlying this provision is that the
tax assessment process is merely clerical in nature, and often results
in inadvertent violations of the automatic stay.39 Yet this automatic
stay exception is not merely a matter of administrative convenience,
as its proponents led Congress to believe. Indeed, the provision has
profound substantive ramifications as well.
As Part III of this article clearly demonstrates, tax assessment,
together with notice and demand for payment, automatically create a
statutory tax lien in favor of the government by operation of law.4°
The tax lien attaches to all of the debtor's property, including prop-
erty acquired after the debtor files his bankruptcy petition.4 1 Recog-
nizing the enormous economic advantages that a tax lien affords,
Congress provided in the 1994 Act that the lien could attach only to
property that would be revested in the debtor.42 Thus, this provision
allows the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") to convert its
federal income tax claim from unsecured to secured status during the
bankruptcy proceeding without violating the automatic stay, at least
with respect to the debtor's exempt and post-petition property.
43
Empirical studies estimate that unsecured creditors, including
creditors entitled to priority treatment in bankruptcy,44 receive no
36 For a comprehensive discussion of the tax assessment process, see infra
notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
38 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 116, 108 Stat.
4106, 4119 (1994) (codified at 11 U.S.C § 362(b)(9)(D) (1994)). For a more de-
tailed discussion of the automatic stay, see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying
text.
39 See S. REP. No. 103-368, at 43 (1993); see also infra notes 120-21 and ac-
companying text.
40 See I.R.C. §§ 6321-6322, 6331(a) (1994); see also infra notes 123-34 and
accompanying text.
41 See I.R.C. § 6321 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1 (as amended in 1978).
42 For a more detailed discussion of this limitation on the tax lien, see infra
notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exemp-
tion process.
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
20011
HeinOnline  -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 727 2000-2001
Virginia Tax Review
payment in over ninety percent of all consumer bankruptcy cases.45
Accordingly, in the vast majority of cases, creditors holding support
claims will recognize no financial benefit from being afforded sev-
enth priority status in bankruptcy. The only hope that these creditors,
and all other unsecured creditors, have for satisfying their claims
against the debtor is to have the claims declared to be nondischarge-
able debts in the bankruptcy proceeding.46
Both tax and support claims are generally granted nondis-
chargeability status in bankruptcy, and thus both types of debts can
proceed against the debtor's post-petition and exempt property. 47 Yet
only the income tax creditor can create a lien on this property during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding without violating the
automatic stay. Consequently, the tax debt will become a secured
claim and will be satisfied out of the debtor's post-petition and ex-
empt property before unsecured support claimants can receive any
payment on their debts. 48 This unfortunate result contravenes one of
the principal goals of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, protecting
spouses and children in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. It was
permitted to occur because Congress failed to adhere to proper legis-
lative procedures when it passed the 1994 Act. Accordingly, this
article calls for the repeal of the Bankruptcy Code's provision permit-
ting the government to assess a tax post-petition and convert from
unsecured to secured status without violating the stay.
It is reasonable to question whether the issues addressed in
this article continue to be relevant more than six years after the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was enacted. Consider, however, that in
45 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 203 (1989); see also infra notes
191-92 and accompanying test.
46 The concept of nondischargeability is addressed infra notes 73-74 and ac-
companying text.
47 See infra Part III.
48 To the extent that a support claim is secured, it will either be paid in full
during the bankruptcy proceeding or the bankruptcy trustee will abandon the prop-
erty securing the claim to the creditor. In either case, the secured support claimaint
will not be forced to compete with tax claims at the conclusion of the proceeding.
For a more comprehensive treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy, see infra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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1999, recognizing that the country's bankruptcy system was "in a
state of crisis,14 9 Congress once again attempted to pass bankruptcy
reform legislation aimed, at least in part, at the same policy of en-
hancing the position of alimony and child support claimants in a
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.50 Both House Bill 833 and Senate
Bill 625 would have elevated support claims from seventh to first
priority status in bankruptcy. 51 In an unrelated section of both bills,
Congress established two new categories of nondischargeable debts
that would have included a significant number of previously dis-
chargeable credit card obligations.52 Critics of the proposed legisla-
tion in both houses of Congress argued that, because unsecured credi-
tors rarely receive any payment in consumer bankruptcy proceedings,
elevating support from a seventh to a first priority claim was mean-
ingless. Moreover, these critics asserted that the legislation would
force vulnerable spouses and children to compete with powerful
credit card companies for the debtor's remaining assets after the con-
clusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, and that the weaker family
creditors were bound to lose the battle.54 Precisely the same argu-
49 S. REP. No. 106-49, at 2 (1999).
50 See id. at 10 (noting that support is "a lifeline for thousands of families
struggling to maintain self-sufficiency.").
51 See S. 625, 106 t Cong. § 212 (1999); H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 139 (1999).
52 See S. 625, 106th Cong. §§ 310, 314 (1999); H.R. 833, 106 t' Cong. §§ 133,
146 (1999). Similar legislation was introduced in 1998. See H.R. 3150, 105 t'
Cong. §§ 141-42 (1998).
53 See H.R. REP. No. 106-123(I), at 403 (1999) ("It is misleading to suggest
that moving up to 'first priority' from 'seventh priority' makes a significant differ-
ence: the debts that have second through sixth priorities almost never appear in
consumer cases."); see also S. REP. No. 106-49, at 111 ("By moving domestic
support obligations to first priority, the amendment displaces the expenses of ad-
ministering the bankruptcy estate."); Letter from Charles J. Tabb, Professor of Law
at the University of Illinois College of Law (together with 81 other commercial law
professors) to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, Ranking Members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee 3 (Sept. 7, 1999) (on file with author) ("Changing the
priority in distribution during bankruptcy will make a difference to women and
children in less than 1% of the cases, and could actually result in reduced payments
in some instances. The priority provision does not affect priority or collection
rights after the bankruptcy case is over. Collecting after bankruptcy-not during
bankruptcy-is often the significant issue for support recipients.").
54 See S. REP. No. 106-49, at 110 ("'The legislation effectively places spousal
2001]
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ment should have been raised in opposition to the special interest
provisions in the 1994 Act favoring the government over support
claimants, but was not. It is now time to rectify this significant ineq-
uity between tax and support claims in the Bankruptcy Code.
This article is premised on the assumption that the congres-
sional goal of preferring support claims over federal income tax
claims is indeed a laudable one, based on three interrelated policy
justifications. First, support claimants are unable to spread their risk
of loss like the government is able to do by raising tax rates or in-
creasing tax revenue from other sources. As three prominent bank-
ruptcy scholars noted in their recent study of consumer bankruptcy
entitled The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt:55
Bankruptcy laws offer special protection to children
and ex-spouses because they are unlike most other un-
secured creditors, such as credit card issuers or fi-
nance companies. Children and ex-spouses cannot
change high interest rates to cover their bankruptcy
losses. They cannot decide to stop doing business
with someone to control their credit risks. They can-
not spread their risks by taking on hundreds of fathers
or husbands, so that they are able to withstand the im-
pact of having one of them file for bankruptcy. The
special protection for alimony and child support is sol-
and child support obligations on equal footing with some consumer debt. This
means that custodial parents and ex-spouses have to compete in bankruptcy and
post-bankruptcy courts with the vast resources of these commercial lenders with
little likelihood of success.") (quoting letter of May 5, 1998 from 31 Senators to
Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Leahy); H.R. REP. No. 106-123(I), at 402
(1999) ("'[I]f credit card debt is added to the current list of items that are now not
dischargeable after a bankruptcy of a support payer, the alimony and child support
recipient will be forced to compete with the well organized, well financed, and
obscenely profitable credit card companies .... It is not a fair fight and it is one
that women and children who rely on support will lose."') (quoting Statement of
Marshall J. Wolf (May 13, 1998) (on file with the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary)); see also145 CONG. REC. H2659 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Conyers) ("On the creditor's side, the bill pits sophisticated credit card creditors in
direct competition with alimony and child support.").
55 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30.
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idly entrenched in bankruptcy policy and reflected in
the statutes.56
In addition to this risk of loss argument, there is a second
strong policy justification for preferring spouses and children over
the government in bankruptcy. Without significant mechanisms in
place to preserve their system of support, these creditors are likely to
be forced onto the welfare rolls or into bankruptcy, thereby both in-
creasing the welfare burden on state and local governments 57 and
escalating the number of bankruptcy filings. 58 By granting support
claimants priority in bankruptcy over governmental tax claims, Con-
gress has enabled these creditors to help themselves and avoid the
devastating psychological impact of welfare.59
56 Id. at 177.
57 See e.g., Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (one
purpose behind the nondischargeability of support claims in bankruptcy is to pro-
tect society "from an increased welfare burden that may result if debtors could
avoid their familial responsibilities by filing for bankruptcy."); Madison Grose,
Comment, Putative Spousal Support Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25
UCLA L. REV. 96, 96-97 n.7 (1977) ("[B]roken families and an increased welfare
burden on state and local governments would be a likely result of allowing bank-
rupts to discharge support obligations.") (citing HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 441-42 (1968)); see also SULLIVAN
ET AL., supra note 30, at 177; Veryl Victoria Miles, The Nondischargeability of
Divorce-Based Debts in Bankruptcy: A Legislative Response to the Hardened
Heart, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1171, 1205 (1997).
58 See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and
Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, COM. L.J., June-July
1983, at 288, 289 ("[A] possibly common cause of female-alone bankruptcy is the
failure to get support and maintenance payments from separated and divorced
spouses.").
9 See, e.g., Himmelfarb, supra note 6, at 685; Rukmalie Jayakody et al., Wel-
fare Reform, Substance Use, and Mental Health, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
623, 624, 630 (2000) ("A growing literature documents the prevalence of physical,
mental, and behavioral health problems among welfare recipients."); see also Bruce
J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering With the Government as a
Mechanism For Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 793-94
(1991).
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Finally, spouses and children are often unsophisticated credi-
tors, unaware of possible avenues available to pursue their claims
against the debtor. Moreover, even if family creditors are able to
discover available methods for enforcing their claims, they often lack
the financial ability to do so. 6 1 Conversely, the government deals
with financially troubled debtors and debtors in bankruptcy on a daily
basis; as a result it can, and does, regularly avail itself of all legal
mechanisms to satisfy its tax claims. These three interrelated policy
justifications together form the basis for this article's contention that
the goal of affording support claimants greater protection in a
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding is a noble one that the bankruptcy
laws should be designed to achieve.
Part II of this article outlines the statutory provisions govern-
ing the treatment of support and tax claims in bankruptcy, with spe-
cific emphasis on the changes made by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994. Part III then dissects the anatomy of a tax lien, including
how it arises, the property to which it attaches, and the relative prior-
ity afforded tax liens vis-a-vis competing secured claims of other
creditors. Finally, Part IV explores the conflict between tax and sup-
port claims in bankruptcy occasioned by the 1994 Act. It concludes
that the only way to further the Act's underlying policy of protecting
spouses and children in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding is to repeal
60 As one author states, "there is considerable empirical work suggesting that
women are generally less aware than men of the legal options available to them."
See Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual
Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1536 (1990) (reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET
AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA (1989)).
61 Other reasons for protecting alimony and support claims in a debtor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding generally (as opposed to vis-a-vis the government) include the
fact that the dependent spouse "might lack the skills necessary to obtain a satisfac-
tory level of employment or might be incapable of working at all. A spouse's entry
into the job market might necessitate neglect of children, and the realities of sexual
discrimination, such as lower wages and limited job opportunities, offer little as-
surance that the creditor-spouse's efforts would be rewarded." Grose, supra note
57, at 96-97 n.7; see also Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316 n.3; Brian P. Roth-
enberg, Comment, The Dischargeability of Marital Obligations: Three Justifica-
tions for the Repeal of§ 523(a)(15), 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 135, 140 n.21 (1996).
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section 362(b)(9)(D) and eliminate one of the government's primary
special interest provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.
H. THE TREATMENT OF SUPPORT AND TAX CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY:
A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
When an individual debtor files for bankruptcy protection un-
der either chapter 762 or chapter 1363 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 an
estate is created by operation of law.65 The estate is comprised of all
of the debtor's pre-petition property, with certain very limited excep-
62 Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is the general liquidation proceeding, in
which a debtor gives up most of his pre-petition property in exchange for a dis-
charge of his debts. The bankruptcy trustee sells the property and distributes the
proceeds to the debtor's creditors in the order prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
63 Under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, generally referred to as the reha-
bilitation proceeding, the debtor retains her pre-petition property, but agrees to use
her future earnings, usually for a three- to five-year period, to pay her creditors. At
the end of this period, the debtor is generally discharged from her remaining debts.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1994).
64 Unless otherwise stated, references in this article to the "Bankruptcy Code"
are to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1330 (1994).
Although individual debtors generally file for bankruptcy relief under either chap-
ter 7 or chapter 13, the Supreme Court has held that they are also entitled to file a
bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which generally
governs corporate reorganizations. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166
(1991). Because chapter 11 reorganizations are very time consuming and expen-
sive relative to chapter 7 or chapter 13, however, it is a rare case in which an indi-
vidual debtor would choose chapter 11 over the other two types of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968 ("[t]he procedures of chapter 11 ... are sufficiently bur-
densome that their use will only make sense in the business context, and not in the
consumer context."). A recent empirical study, however, concluded that individu-
als owning businesses may be filing chapter 11 petitions in greater numbers than
originally anticipated. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Financial Char-
acteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 501 (1999) (au-
thors found that individuals, not corporate entities, filed one-quarter of chapter 11
business bankruptcies). Nevertheless, because this study focused on business
rather than consumer bankruptcies, the remainder of this article will proceed on the
assumption that an individual debtor will avail himself of either chapter 7 or chap-
ter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but not chapter 11.
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
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66tions. The Bankruptcy Code then allows the debtor to designate
certain estate property as exempt, and retain it for his fresh start after
bankruptcy.67 Although the precise scope of bankruptcy exemptions
is a hotly contested topic in bankruptcy circles, 6 8 it is widely accepted
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (b), (c)(2) (1994).
67 See. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086 (the fresh start allows debtors "to get out from under the debilitating
effects of too much debt .... The two most important aspects of the fresh start
available under the Bankruptcy laws that are the provision of adequate property for
a return to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection
attempts.").
A debtor is generally entitled to select either the exemptions of the state in which
he resides (together with exemptions established under federal nonbankruptcy laws
and joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties property exempt from the reach of
creditors under nonbankruptcy law), see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (2) (1994), or the
federal exemptions set forth in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, whichever is
more generous. States may, however, opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemption
scheme, in which case the debtor must use the exemptions provided under the laws
of the debtor's state of residence. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994).
68 Bankruptcy scholars have offered a variety of proposed reforms to the pre-
sent exemption scheme. See, e.g., The Honorable William H. Brown, Political and
Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations-The "Opt-Out" as Child of the
First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 215 (1997) (author pro-
poses that the Bankruptcy Code's opt-out provision be repealed, and replaced with
federal exemptions, adjusted geographically to reflect cost-of-living differences);
James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemp-
tions in a Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 41-42 (1983) (author argues that
states' ability to opt out of the federal exemption scheme has crippled bankruptcy
reform efforts; he proposes that Congress repeal the opt-out provision and establish
a federal floor exemption); Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and
Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 22, 104-05 (1983) (author posits that allowing states to enact dis-
parite bankruptcy exemption schemes undermines the notion of uniformity envi-
sioned by the Framers of the Constitution; she suggests revising the Bankruptcy
Code to adopt federal exemptions having no reference to state exemption law);
Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851,
867-69 (1999) (author proposes a uniform "umbrella" exemption amount for all
debtors in bankruptcy); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A
Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Pro-
posal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 685, 713.(1998) (as one alternative to the
present exemption scheme, the author argues in favor of a $30,000 lump-sum ex-
emption amount that debtors could apply to any property).
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that the debtor should be able to exempt out of the bankruptcy estate
enough property to provide the debtor and her dependents with a ba-
sic standard of living following bankruptcy.
69
An individual debtor's primary goal in filing for bankruptcy
is to obtain a discharge 70 of all debts that remain unpaid after the
bankruptcy proceeding has concluded.7' "Although a relatively re-
cent addition to bankruptcy law, the discharge has become firmly
entrenched in the logic and lore of bankruptcy law and practice.""
Yet while the policy justifications in favor of the debtor's discharge
are strong, competing policies suggest that a debtor should not be
entitled to discharge certain debts in bankruptcy. 73  Both support
claims and federal income taxes fall within the categories of debts
that are nondischargeable in an individual debtor's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.74 These claims are also entitled to priority payment status in
bankruptcy, which allows them to be paid before other unsecured
69 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6087 (the historical purpose behind exemption laws is to provide a debtor
"with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his non-
exempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public charge ....
[T]here is a federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."); see also Mendales,
supra note 68, at 853 ("The substantive purpose of personal exemptions in bank-
ruptcy is to ensure that individual debtors will not emerge from bankruptcy com-
pletely destitute, but rather with certain basic properties needed both to live from
day to day and for quick reentry into normal economic life.").
70 Dischargeability of debts is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994) in chapter
7 cases, 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994) in chapter 11 cases, and 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1994)
in chapter 13 cases.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125, 128 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086, 6089; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
(1991) ("[T]he central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which
certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors,
and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."' (quoting Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
72 Jack F. Williams and Tamara Miles Ogier, A Collision of Policy: Chapter
13 and Taxes, 50 S.C. L. REv. 313, 342 (1999).
73 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. at 287.
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1994), (5) (1994 & Supp. 111996); see also infra
notes 76-85, 107-08 and accompanying text.
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claimants receive any payment in the bankruptcy proceeding. 75 Be-
cause an understanding of the scope of, and interrelationship be-
tween, these nondischargeability and priority provisions is necessary
before exploring the tension between support and tax claims in bank-
ruptcy, this article will next explore the treatment of each of these
claims in the bankruptcy context.
A. Alimony, Maintenance, and Support Claims
Since the inception of this country's bankruptcy laws, claims
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support have been one of
the principal categories of nondischargeable debts.76
75 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), (8) (1994). For a more complete discussion of
these priority rules, see infra notes 86-93, 102-06 and accompanying text.
76 In Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901), the Supreme Court, relying in
part on the reasoning espoused in Barclay v. Barclay, 56 N.E. 636, 637 (111. 1900),
held that alimony, maintenance, and support claims were nondischargeable debts
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. at 580; see
also Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 73-77 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S.
340, 351-53 (1903). In 1903, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to
clarify its earlier intention in the 1898 Act to make alimony, maintenance, and
support nondischargeable in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. See Act of Feb. 5,
1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (repealed 1978). The provision stated that all
debts were dischargeable in bankruptcy except those that "are for alimony due or
to become due, or for maintenance and support of wife or child." Id. Although one
court struck down this provision in 1977 as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, see Schiffman v. Wasserman (In re Wasserman), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas.
611 (MB) (D.R.I. 1977), Congress retained the nondischargeability of support obli-
gations when it completely overhauled the bankruptcy laws one year later, using
gender-neutral language. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 129 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6090.
Whether a particular debt will be considered to be in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, or support is an issue to be determined not under state law, but rather un-
der federal bankruptcy law. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320; see also Williams v. Williams (In re Williams),
703 F.2d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 1983). Subsequent cases have held, however, that
state law should not be considered completely irrelevant in making this determina-
tion. See, e.g., Zaera v. Raff (In re Raft), 93 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Smith v. Billingsley (In re Billingsley), 93 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
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Congress and the courts have reasoned that the policy of pro-
tecting innocent spouses and children from being forced onto wel-
fare77 as a result of the debtor's bankruptcy outweigh the policy of
discharging these debts in order to provide the debtor a fresh start
following the bankruptcy proceeding.78 "Both the 1903 amendment
to the 1898 Act and the common law which preceded it reflected the
societal norm of the time that it was a man's unavoidable duty to care
for his wife and children, even after divorce. 79
Bankruptcy laws have, however, historically made a strict dis-
tinction between support claims and property settlement obliga-
tions.81 While the former have always been granted nondischarge-
77 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 176-77 ("if these [support] obliga-
tions were discharged, some legislators fear that more families would become
charges of the state, increasing the welfare rolls and harming the innocent chil-
dren.")
78 See H.R. REP. No. 57-1698, at 3, 6-7 (1902); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S.
at 580; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 177 ("Bankruptcy is about
discharge of debt and financial rebirth, but not at the expense of families left be-
hind."); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.1112] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
rev. 2000) ("Congress has recognized the legitimate needs of the dependents of a
bankruptcy debtor and has overridden the general bankruptcy policy in which ex-
ceptions to discharge are construed narrowly.") (footnotes omitted); Rothenberg,
supra note 61, at 140 (A spouse's obligation to support his former spouse and
children has long been recognized as an important societal responsibility .... be-
cause support debts, such as alimony and child support, provide for the ongoing
needs and maintenance of the ex-spouse and children.").
79 Alexander, supra note 8, at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
80 Under the Bankruptcy Code, an obligation is in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, or support only if it is "in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree, or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or a property settlement .... " See
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). The Bankruptcy Code further pro-
vides that an obligation will not be treated as a support claim for purposes of the
nondischargeability rules if it is assigned to another entity. See id. The Bankruptcy
Code, however, has been amended several times since 1978, so that § 523(a)(5)
now provides that a support claim assigned either (i) to the federal or state govern-
ment, or any political subdivision of the state, or (ii) to an entity pursuant to §
408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, is still entitled to nondischargeability status
under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
81 Courts have experienced great difficulty attempting to determine whether an
obligation was intended by the parties to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
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ability status as a matter of public policy, 82 it was not until the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 199483 that property settlements were first
granted nondischargeability status, but even then only under limited
circumstances. 84 Moreover, although most creditors holding nondis-
or support, on the one hand, or a property settlement, on the other. See, e.g., Fried-
kin v. Sternberg (In re Sternberg), 85 F.3d 1400, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1996); Yeates v.
Yeates (In re Yeates), 807 F.2d 874, 877-79 (10th Cir. 1986). To assist in making
this decision, courts have developed a number of factors to use in assessing
whether an obligation is in the nature of support or a property division, such as the
parties' respective financial positions at the time the obligation was created, see
Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1081 (1995), as well as how the parties have treated the obligation for tax
purposes. See, e.g., Robb-Fulton v. Robb (In re Robb), 23 F.3d 895, 898-99 (4th
Cir. 1994). For a complete discussion of the factors used by courts in making the
support/property settlement distinction, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.11[6] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2000).
A number of scholars have recently argued that the Bankruptcy Code should not
make a distinction between support obligations and property settlements. See, e.g.,
Catherine E. Vance, Till Debt Do Us Part: Irreconcilable Differences in the Un-
happy Union of Bankruptcy and Divorce, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 369, 432 (1997); see
also Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 160. In fact, one leading bankruptcy treatise has
categorized the distinction between support claims and property settlement obliga-
tions as "faint, irregular and blurred." 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §
7-29, at 370 (1992). Another commentator has stated that support claims and prop-
erty settlements are "a seamless web," and suggested that trying to distinguish be-
tween them is "a fruitless and harmful endeavor." Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., The
Bankruptcy Reform Act and Its Effect on Family Law Proceedings, 28 SUFFOLK L.
REv. 657, 660 (1994).
82 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 42 (1994)
(statement of Kenneth N. Klee, Chairman of the Legislation Committee of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference); see also Vance, supra note 81, at 387 ("It is mani-
festly unjust to say that, as a matter of policy, it is acceptable to reduce the creditor
spouse's finances to the level of mere subsistence for the sake of permitting her
former spouse to 'start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities' of his
indebtedness." (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
83 Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
84 Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994), property settlements are nondis-
chargeable unless the debtor can establish either (i) that she does not have the abil-
ity to pay the property settlement obligation after providing for reasonable necessi-
ties for herself and her dependents (and, if she has a business, expenses for the
operation of the business), or (ii) that the benefit that she would receive from hav-
ing the obligation discharged outweighs the harm to her spouse, former spouse, or
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chargeable claims cannot proceed against the debtor's exempt prop-
erty after bankruptcy in order to collect their claims, creditors hold-
ing support claims (but not property settlement claims) are granted
special status under the Bankruptcy Code and can seize the debtor's
exempt property to satisfy their nondischargeable debts at the close
of the bankruptcy proceeding.
85
Prior to 1994, the Bankruptcy Code did not afford support
claims priority payment status. Therefore, other unsecured claims
granted priority status under the Bankruptcy Code, such as taxes and
administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate, were paid in full
before creditors holding support claims could receive any payment in
a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.86 As previously discussed, a pri-
mary congressional goal in enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 was to afford better protection to support claimants. 87  The
Act's legislative history is replete with examples of how debtors were
child from not receiving the property settlement. Moreover, a creditor holding a
property settlement claim must bring a suit against the debtor in bankruptcy to
establish nondischargeability of the claim within 60 days of the first creditors'
meeting held under §341 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 523(c)
(1994); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). Conversely, creditors holding alimony,
maintenance, and support claims need not file a lawsuit to determine nondischarge-
ability; such claims are granted nondischargeability status automatically under the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1994). One commentator has referred
to this distinction between property settlements and support obligations as "a pro-
cedural trap . . . for the unwary creditor spouse." Michaela M. White, Divorce
After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Can You Stay Warm After You Split the
Blanket?, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 617, 626 (1996). For a comprehensive discussion
of the problems and uncertainties arising under § 523(a)(15), see Mary Jo Newborn
Wiggins, Testing the Limits of Congressional Intent: Divorce Obligations After the
1994 Reform Act, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181 (1997).
85 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (1994).
86 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
87 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 33 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3342 (protection of alimony and child support are of "para-
mount societal importance"); 140 CONG. REC. H10764 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Brooks) ("(A] debtor should not use the protection of a bank-
ruptcy filing in order to avoid legitimate marital and child support obligations.");
see also 140 CONG. REC. H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter) ("H.R. 5116 gives added protection to child support and alimony pay-
ments in the event of a bankruptcy filing.").
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abusing the bankruptcy system by "weaseling out of their child sup-
port obligations." 88 Thus, one of the strongest protections afforded
support claimants under the Act was to grant them seventh priority
status in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. 89 Because federal income
tax claims had previously occupied seventh priority status, Congress
deliberately placed support claimants ahead of the government,
which held federal income tax claims against the debtor. Accord-
ingly, although support claimants will receive nothing in a debtor's
bankruptcy until higher priority claimants, such as administrative
expenses of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, are paid,91 they will be
88 See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 10 (1994)
(statement of Rep. Schroeder); see also id. at 239 (statement of Rep. Schroeder)
("We think it is a very important principle that people cannot go into bankruptcy
and shed their family responsibilities."); 140 CONG. REC. H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1994) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) ("I have heard heartbreaking stories from sin-
gle parents who want nothing but the best for their children, but find themselves
forced to fight for their rightful level of child support. With no other recourse,
these families often turn to welfare to provide the child support the absent parent
ought to be responsible for. H.R. 5116 takes an important first step in breaking this
tragic cycle by strengthening current bankruptcy law and enforcing tougher meas-
ures for child support and alimony collection.").
89 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat.
4106, 4132-33 (1994). It is important to note, however, that this priority status
extends only to support claims, not property settlement obligations. Moreover,
unlike the provisions governing nondischargeability of support claims, which have
been amended to provide that the claims remain nondischargeable even if assigned
to a governmental entity or assigned pursuant to the Social Security Act, § 507
contains no such provision. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A) (1994). Thus, that sec-
tion states that, if a support claim is assigned to another entity, either voluntarily or
by operation of law, it is not entitled to seventh priority status in bankruptcy. See
id. It is unclear whether this is merely a drafting error caused by the haste with
which the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was passed, or is a substantive distinc-
tion between the Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability and priority provisions.
Nevertheless, § 507(a)(7), as currently drafted, offers no priority treatment to sup-
port claims being paid through governmental agencies (presumably done so to take
advantage of state statutory provisions creating liens on the debtor's property for
unpiad support, if the payments are to be made directly to the agency). See infra
notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Kristof, supra note 32, at C3.
91 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(l)-(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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paid in full before governmental tax claims and general unsecured
creditors receive anything in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.
The Act's change regarding the priority status of support
claims in bankruptcy has had a special impact on chapter 13 proceed-
ings. Under section 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code, debtors filing for
chapter 13 bankruptcy relief must provide in their rehabilitation plans
for the full payment of priority claims.92 Accordingly, because sup-
port claims are now afforded priority status, they must be paid in full
under a debtor's chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, making chapter 13 a
less attractive option than chapter 7 for debtors having significant
support obligations that are unpaid.93
The final provision affecting support claims in bankruptcy is
section 362, the automatic stay. 94 When a debtor files a bankruptcy
petition under either chapter 7 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
automatic stay is created by operation of law and prevents creditors
from taking any action against the debtor, his property, or property of
the estate in an attempt to collect their debts. 9 Although the scope of
the automatic stay is quite broad, the Bankruptcy Code provides a
number of exceptions to its application. For example, it is not a vio-
lation of the automatic stay for creditors holding support claims to
92 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1994). A claim holder can, however, agree to
receive less than full payment of her priority claim under a debtor's chapter 13
plan. See id.
93 It is important to note that priority status is granted only to alimony, mainte-
nance, and support claims, and not to property settlement claims. See 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(7)(B) (1994). Thus, creditors have a great incentive to having their claims
declared as support claims rather than as property settlements, and the trustee and
debtors have an equal incentive to argue for the opposite result. See, e.g., Dewey v.
Dewey (In re Dewey), 223 B.R. 559, 562-65 (10th Cir. BAP 1998); In re Lutzke,
223 B.R. 552, 553-55 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1998); In re Beverly, 196 B.R. 128, 130-33
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996); In re Grady, 180 B.R. 461, 464-66 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1995).
94 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
95 Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125-26 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086-87 ("The stay is the first part of bankruptcy relief, for it
gives the debtor respite from the forces that led him into bankruptcy."). Penalties
for violating the automatic stay against an individual debtor can include compensa-
tory damages, attorney's fees, and, under appropriate circumstances, even punitive
damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994).
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collect those claims from property that is not property of the estate
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 96 This exception
generally allows support claimants to proceed against property ac-
quired by the debtor post-petition, as well as her exempt property,
97
in an attempt to collect support claims after the filing of the debtor's
bankruptcy petition.
98
In a further attempt to bolster the ability of spouses and chil-
dren to enforce their support claims in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 also amended the Bankruptcy Code to allow
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (1994) (The filing of a petition... does not
operate as a stay ... of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from
property that is not property of the estate"). Because the debtor's post-petition
wages are property of the estate in a chapter 13 proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
1306(a)(2) (1994), most courts have held that it is a violation of the automatic stay
for a support creditor to garnish the debtor's post-petition wages in an attempt to
collect alimony and child support arrearages. See, e.g., In re Bunn, 170 B.R. 670,
673 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).
97 Although the statute is not absolutely clear that this exception allows a
creditor to proceed against the debtor's exempt property, the legislative history to
the Bankruptcy Code specifically so states. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 51 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
342 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299. Moreover, cases have
also held that the exemption applies both to the debtor's post-petition property as
well as her exempt property. See, e.g., In re Cole, 202 B.R. 356, 358-59 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
98 While the definition of a claim under § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code is
broad enough to include post-petition alimony, maintenance, and support claims
because the court order or judgment giving rise to those claims occurred pre-
petition, the Bankruptcy Code contains special provisions that, when taken to-
gether, have the effect of treating these post-petition alimony, maintenance, and
support claims as post-petition claims rather than pre-petition claims. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101(5), 502(b)(5) (1994). Because post-petition claims can proceed against the
debtor's post-petition property without violating the automatic stay, § 362(b)(2)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code does no more than to allow support claims arising post-
petition to do the same.
. In several cases, however, lower courts have held that § 362(b)(2)(B) also
permits pre-petition alimony, maintenance, and support claimants to proceed
against the debtor's post-petition and exempt property during pendency of the
bankruptcy proceeding without violating the stay. See, e.g., In re Cole, 202 B.R. at
358; Sinewitz v. Sinewitz (In re Sinewitz), 166 B.R. 786, 789 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994); Rogers v. Overstreet (In re Rogers), 164 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1994).
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claimants to establish or modify support claims without violating the
automatic stay.99 Whether this provision permits the creation of a
lien as part of the establishment or modification of a support claim
has not yet been determined.'°
B. Tax Claims
When an individual debtor files a bankruptcy petition, she-of-
ten owes the federal government past income taxes. In fact, studies
have estimated that nearly one in every five debtors lists income
taxes as a significant unpaid debt. 0 1 Thus, the treatment of tax
99 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). The Act also permitted an action
for the establishment of paternity to proceed without violating the automatic stay.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
100 A leading bankruptcy treatise suggests that this provision is not broad
enough to exempt actions to enforce support obligations from the scope of the stay.
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.05[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev.
2000) ("Proceedings to enforce such [establishment or modification] orders are
conspicuously omitted from that exception and continue to be stayed, except in
cases in which they are criminal in nature and permitted by section 362(b)(1).").
101 See, e.g., Shuchman, supra note 58, at 301-03 (the author estimated that
approximately 16% of all cases surveyed included priority income tax claims as a
significant debt); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 297 (in a massive
study of consumer debtors filing for bankruptcy relief in 1981, the authors esti-
mated that taxes represented approximately 13% of "reluctant debt," comprised of
debt held by creditors who did not initially seek a debtor-creditor relationship);
Philip Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1982-1983: An Empirical Study, 15 SETON
HALL L. REV. 541, 575 (1985) (the author suggested that approximately 13% of the
186 cases surveyed included income tax claims as one of the debtor's priority
debts); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 64, at 559 (the authors similarly found
that approximately 20% of all business and consumer bankruptcies filed under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code listed federal income taxes as a factor precipi-
tating their bankruptcy filings). While this article refers to bankruptcy statistics
from time to time in support of the arguments raised herein, it is important to note
that there is a dearth of empirical evidence in the bankruptcy area, in large part
because the government collects very few basic bankruptcy statistics. See, e.g.,
Warren & Westbrook, supra note 64, at 502, 506-07. Authors such as Elizabeth
Warren and Jay Westbrook, however, have recently made great strides in rectifying
this paucity of empirical data.
Although a debtor may have other unpaid tax debts when she files for bank-
ruptcy, such as property taxes and employment taxes, this article focuses only on
federal income tax claims. Thus, references in this article to tax claims and taxes
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claims in an individual debtor's bankruptcy proceeding is an impor-
tant aspect of the bankruptcy process.
After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added support ob-
ligations as a seventh priority claim in bankruptcy, federal income
taxes are now treated as an eighth priority claim, but only if they
meet two technical requirements. 10 2  First, the taxes must be due,
with extensions, after three years before the filing of the debtor's
bankruptcy petition. 10 3  Second, the taxes must apply to a taxable
year ending on or before the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy peti-
tion. 1° 4 The Bankruptcy Code also affords eighth priority status to
are to federal income taxes, unless otherwise specified.
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994). Before the Act, most taxes were afforded
a seventh priority in bankruptcy. Because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
however, established that alimony, maintenance, and support claims would be
granted a seventh priority in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, tax claims were
reduced to eighth priority status. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 304, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132-33 (1994).
103 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994). This somewhat confusing statutory lan-
guage is necessary to include certain taxes due after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition within the Bankruptcy Code's eighth priority status. For example, if a
debtor files for bankruptcy on February 1, 2000, his 1999 income taxes will be-
come due on April 15, 2000. Three years before the filing of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy petition is February 1, 1997. Because the 1999 taxes are due on April 15,
2000, they fall within the prescribed period, and thus meet the first requirement for
eight priority status.
104 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (1994). For example, if a debtor files for
bankruptcy on February 1, 2000, her income taxes for the year 2000 will be due on
April 15, 2001 (assuming that she is a calendar year taxpayer). Thus, the debtor's
2000 taxes are not due on or before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and thus
would not be afforded a priority status in the debtor's bankruptcy. I.R.C. § 1398
(1994), however, allows the debtor to make an election to truncate the year that she
files her bankruptcy petition into two short taxable years: the first year would run
from January 1, 2000 until January 31, 2000 (the day before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition), while the second taxable year would run from the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, February 1, 2000, to the end of the taxable year, December 31,
2000. If the debtor makes this election, then the short taxable year ending the day
before her bankruptcy filing would be granted an eighth priority status because the
tax year would end prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, namely January
31, 2000 and the tax return for that short year would still be due after the filing, on
April 15, 2001. See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (1994). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of this short-year election, see Jack F. Williams, The Federal Tax Conse-
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taxes assessed within 240 days before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 105 The 240-day time period is tolled during any time period
in which compromise negotiations are occurring between the tax-
payer and the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service"), plus thirty
days thereafter. This provision closes a loophole that had allowed a
taxpayer to submit a compromise offer to the Service after assess-
ment, engage in extended negotiations with the Service until the Ser-
vice lost priority for the tax liability under the three-year rule dis-
cussed above, and then file for bankruptcy before the Service could
take any steps to collect its tax claim. 106
Unsecured tax claims are also deemed nondischargeable in a
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, but only to the extent that they (i)
qualify for priority status under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code,
as discussed in the preceding paragraph, or (ii) arise out of a tax re-
turn that was either not filed, filed late and at any time after two years
before the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition, or fraudulently
filed. 10 7 Moreover, like support claimants, creditors holding nondis-
chargeable federal income tax claims can also proceed against the
debtor's exempt assets after bankruptcy in order to satisfy their
claims. 108
If a debtor has filed for relief under chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, taxes accorded eighth priority status in bankruptcy must
be paid in full over the duration of the debtor's bankruptcy plan, usu-
quences of Individual Debtor Chapter 11 Cases, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1203, 1238-42
(1995).
105 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1994).
106 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 71 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5857. For a more comprehensive discussion of the eighth priority status of federal
income taxes in bankruptcy, see Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Bankruptcy: Tax Issues
Affecting Insolvent and Bankrupt Debtors, in 165 BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WrrH
TAX PLANNING 158-111 to 158-114 (1998).
107 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii), (C) (1994). In addition to the foregoing
categories of nondischargeable tax claims, all of the debtor's pre-petition debts
become nondischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor has
engaged in intentional wrongdoing, such as concealing property from creditors,
engaging in fraud, or refusing to obey the orders of the bankruptcy court. See 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)-(10) (1994).
108 See II U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (1994).
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ally three to five years. 10 9 Therefore, because most tax claims are
granted eighth priority status in bankruptcy, the debtor will be re-
quired to pay them in full over the life of her rehabilitation plan."10
Although the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions
generally prevent the Service from taking any action post-petition to
satisfy its tax claims, including creating a tax lien post-petition to
secure a pre-petition tax claim, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
amended the automatic stay provisions to allow the federal govern-
ment to take a number of actions post-petition with respect to tax
claims without violating the automatic stay. First, the federal gov-
ernment can audit the debtor post-petition in order to establish a tax
liability without violating the stay.'1 It can also issue a notice of tax
deficiency to the debtor. 112  Third, the government can make a de-
109 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2), (d) (1994).
110 For a complete discussion of taxes that are granted eighth priority status in
bankruptcy, see supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. It is important to note,
however, that tax scholars have repeatedly voiced concern over a technical error in
the chapter 13 tax provisions that allows the most undeserving debtors to discharge
taxes arising out of fraudulently filed returns and returns that were never filed
without being required to pay them in full over the life of their rehabilitation plans.
As one commentator explains, "Section 1328(a) does not except 523(a)(1) taxes
from discharge because priority taxes must be paid in full through the plan prior to
discharge. However, section 523(a)(1)(B) and (C), arising under the most egre-
gious of circumstances, are not treated as priority taxes under section 507(a)(8).
The statutory structure works well in chapter 7 but fails miserably in chapter 13."
Steven J. Csontos et al., Congress's Role in Bankruptcy Tax Policy: A Roundtable
Discussion, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 257, 287 (1995) (remarks of the Honor-
able Polly Higdon). As a solution to this problem, several scholars have proposed
that taxes falling under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) or (C) (1994) should be nondis-
chargeable in chapter 13. See Williams & Ogier, supra note 72, at 340-41; Jack F.
Williams, National Bankruptcy Review Commission Tax Recommendations: Indi-
vidual Debtors, Priorities and Discharge, 14 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 70 (1997). It is
interesting to note that, had it passed, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000 would
have made such fraudulent taxes nondischargeable in chapter 13. See H.R. 2415,
106 th Cong. § 707 (2000).
I See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(A) (1994).
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(B) (1994). This exception to the automatic stay
was part of the Bankruptcy Code even before it was amended in 1994. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (amended 1994), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(9)(A)-(D)
(1994).
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mand for the debtor's tax returns without violating the stay."l 3 Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the government can assess a tax against
the debtor 114 and issue a notice and demand for payment to the debtor
without violating the stay. 11
5
As discussed in Part III, these actions are effective to create a
tax lien against the debtor. 16 Recognizing this possibility, Congress
also amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide that any tax lien re-
sulting from the government's actions during the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceeding will be effective only if the tax deficiency for
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(C) (1994).
114 Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the bankruptcy court
enjoys the power to determine the amount or legality of a tax, subject to certain
limited exceptions, even if the tax has not yet been assessed. See 11 U.S.C. §
505(c)' (1994). Thus, even before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was enacted,
the Service could assess a tax against the debtor under certain very limited circum-
stances without violating the stay. Notwithstanding this provision, however, no tax
lien would arise after such assessment because § 505 does not authorize the Service
to issue a notice and demand letter, which is one of the prerequisites for the crea-
tion of a tax lien. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(D) (1994), which states in pertinent part:
The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay ... [of] the
making of an assessment for any tax and issuance of a notice and
demand for payment of such an assessment (but any tax lien that
would otherwise attach to property of the estate by reason of such
an assessment shall not take effect unless such tax is a debt of the
debtor that will not be discharged in the case and such property
or its proceeds are transferred out of the estate to, or otherwise
revested in, the debtor).
116 The Bankruptcy Code recognizes three distinct types of liens: consensual
liens, judicial liens, and statutory liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(36), 101(51), 101(53)
(1994). As the name implies, consensual liens are liens that are created by an
agreement between the debtor and creditor. The most common type of consensual
lien is a security interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (1994). Judicial liens are liens
that arise out of a judicial order or proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) (1994).
The most common categories of judicial liens are equitable liens, attachment liens,
garnishment liens, and execution liens. See James N. Duca, The Interaction Be-
tween Mechanic's Lien Law and the Bankruptcy Code, 53 Bus. LAW. 1283, 1286
(1998). Finally, statutory liens arise by operation of law when specific conditions
are met. Two of the major types of statutory liens are mechanics' liens and tax
liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) (1994); see also Duca, supra, at 1286-87. For a
discussion of the conditions that must be met for a federal income tax lien to arise,
see infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
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which the tax lien arose is a nondischargeable debt under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.117 Moreover, even in such cases, the tax lien will attach
only to property that will be revested in the debtor. 118 Accordingly,
the Service can create a tax lien during the pendency of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding without violating the automatic stay; however, the
lien will attach only to the debtor's exempt property1 9 and property
that the debtor acquires post-petition. The legislative history to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 provides that the purpose underlying
the assessment exception is merely to avoid any unnecessary inter-
ference with the assessment of taxes, which is simply a clerical proc-
ess that often results in inadvertent violations of the automatic
stay. 12  It also states that the exception is not intended to change the
priority of any tax claim.'
21
117 The requirement that the underlying tax debt be a nondischargeable debt
under the Bankruptcy Code was not contained in the original Senate version of the
bill. See S. 540, 103d Cong. § 114 (1993). The original language in Senate Bill
540 was that the tax lien "shall not take effect until the property is no longer prop-
erty of the estate." Id. This language might have suggested that a tax lien created
during the bankruptcy proceeding could attach to property transferred to other
creditors out of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Thus House Bill 5116 amended this
language to reflect the intention of Congress that only property that was transferred
out of the estate or in some way revested in the debtor was eligible for this auto-
matic stay exception. See H.R. 5116, 103d Cong. § 116 (1994).
118 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(9)(D) (1994).
119 For a discussion of the exemption process, see supra notes 67-69 and ac-
companying text.
120 See S. REP. No. 103-168, at 43 (1993). As one official with the Tax Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice explained during a roundtable discussion of bank-
ruptcy tax policy:
The automatic stay relief for assessment of taxes was at the top of
the list that the IRS and the Tax Division had put together. It was
one that we thought did not necessarily involve the most money
of the issues that were on our list. But, from the standpoint of
administrative importance, it was certainly the top issue. The
IRS computer is a key to the assessment of a tax liability. With
the prohibition on assessment, it meant that the IRS had to manu-
ally track all of these accounts. They had trouble with posting
payments to the accounts. They had trouble with determining
when the stay was lifted so that the time for assessment was no
longer suspended .... It created all sorts of headaches for the
IRS and, I'm sure, for other taxing authorities .... [W]e were
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III. ANATOMY OF A TAX LIEN
The federal government has at its disposal a powerful tool to
insure the collection of federal income taxes: the tax lien. 122 Because
the Service can create a tax lien during bankruptcy, it can convert its
claim from unsecured to secured status during the proceeding. Thus,
it is important to understand both the scope and priority of the federal
tax lien before exploring the inherent conflict between tax and sup-
port claims in bankruptcy.
A federal tax lien arises automatically by operation of law
upon the occurrence of three events. First, the Service must make a
valid assessment of the tax. 123 The Service can assess a tax in one of
three ways. If a taxpayer files a return in which she admits a tax li-
ability, but does not pay the full amount of that tax liability, assess-
ment occurs when a representative of the Service records the tax li-
ability in its regional service center. 
124
The second, and most common, method of assessment arises
out of an audit. Generally, the Service initiates an audit when it be-
lieves that the taxpayer has understated his tax liability. In an audit,
the Service examines the taxpayer's books and records. If it finds a
deficiency, the taxpayer can admit to the deficiency, in which case
assessment occurs at the time that the agreed-upon liability is re-
corded with the Service's regional service center. 125 Conversely, if
the taxpayer refuses to accept the tax deficiency, assessment proce-
dures become more complex. The Service will first notify the tax-
very happy to see that Congress took our advice on that issue and
adopted the amendment.
Csontos et al., supra note 110, at 262 (footnotes omitted) (remarks of Steven J.
Csontos).
121 See S. REP. No. 103-168, at 43.
122 For a comprehensive examination of the federal tax lien, see Cecil, supra
note 106, at 158-59 to 158-129. The history of the tax lien is addressed in Morgan
D. King & Jonathan H. Moss, Avoiding Tax Liens on Personal Property in Bank-
ruptcy: A Look at the Interplay Between the Bona Fide Purchaser Provisions of the
Tax and Bankruptcy Codes, 31 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994).
123 See I.R.C. § 6201 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); §§ 6202-03 (1994).
124 See I.R.C. § 6203 (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6203-1 (as amended in
1961).
125 See I.R.C. § 6203 (1994).
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payer in writing of its finding of a tax deficiency, allowing the tax-
payer a thirty-day period either to request an informal conference
regarding the findings or to appeal them to the Appellate Division of
the Internal Revenue Service under a formal procedure. 126 Finally, if
the parties cannot resolve their dispute either through an informal
conference or at the formal Appellate Division hearing, the Service
will then issue a notice, called a ninety-day letter, to the taxpayer,
allowing the taxpayer ninety days after mailing to appeal the Ser-
vice's deficiency to the Tax Court. 127 If the taxpayer does not appeal
the decision in a timely fashion, the Service will assess the tax at the
time that the appeals process ends. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer
files a timely petition with the Tax Court, assessment is generally
postponed until the Tax Court renders its final decision. 128
Although the most common method for assessing a tax is
through the audit procedure described above, the Service has a third
method by which it can make an assessment under special circum-
stances. The procedure, called a jeopardy assessment, can be used by
the Service if it can establish that it will be unduly prejudiced by de-
laying assessment (and the creation of a tax lien, as discussed below)
until the taxpayer utilizes all review procedures available to chal-
lenge the Service's tax deficiency.12 9 Extraordinary circumstances
giving rise to a jeopardy assessment might include the taxpayer's
concealment or removal of property, the taxpayer's attempts to evade
126 See Treas. Reg. §§ 601.105-06 (as amended in 1987). For an indepth dis-
cussion of the procedures regarding deficiency claims, see C. RICHARD MCQUEEN
& JACK F. WILLIAMS, TAx ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:4
(3d ed. 1997); WILLIAM T. PLUMB, JR., FEDERAL TAX LIENS 15 (3d ed. 1972 &
Supp. 1974).
127 See I.R.C. §§ 6212-6213 (West 1998 & West Supp. 2000); Treas. Reg. §
301.6212-1(a) (as amended in 1995). This 90-day period is extended to 150 days
if the notice of deficiency is mailed to a person residing outside of the United
States. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West 1988 & West Supp. 2000).
128 See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (West 1988 & West Supp. 2000); see also Cole v.
United States, 863 F.2d 34, 35 (9th Cir. 1988). For a general discussion of the Tax
Court petition process, see MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 126, § 2:5.
129 See I.R.C. §§ 6861-6862 (1994).
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the Service by leaving the country, or the imminent insolvency or
bankruptcy of the taxpayer.
1 30
After the Service has made an assessment of an income tax
deficiency through one of these three methods, the second step that it
must take to create a tax lien is commonly referred to as the notice
and demand letter. The Service must send a notice of its assessment
to the taxpayer, no later than sixty days after it has assessed the
tax, 131 establishing the amount of the tax deficiency and demanding
payment.
132
The third requirement necessary to establish a valid tax lien is
merely a waiting period. If the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay
the tax deficiency within ten days of the notice and demand, a tax
lien arises automatically and relates back to the date of assessment.'
33
Because the Service is not required to file or perfect the tax lien in
order to validate it, oftentimes the taxpayer will not even know of its
existence; hence the lien is often referred to as a secret lien because
only the Service knows of it.
134
A. Scope and Duration of the Tax Lien
When a tax lien arises, it attaches to all property of the tax-
payer, including realty and personalty. 135 Moreover, the federal tax
130 See Schmitt v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 900, 901 (D. Minn. 1987); Clar-
endon Ltd. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 106, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1(a) (as amended in 1995).
131 Id.
132 See I.R.C. § 6303(b) (1994).
133 See I.R.C. §§ 6321-6322, 6331(a) (1994); see also MICHAEL SALTZMAN,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 14.05 (2d ed. 1991).
134 See Cecil, supra note 106, at 158-61.
135 See I.R.C. § 6321 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that state law is
determinative of whether property is owned by the taxpayer for purposes of the
federal tax lien. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960);
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958). The Supreme Court also held, how-
ever, that even though state law determines a taxpayer's rights to property, federal
law then governs the priority accorded competing liens. "This approach strikes a
proper balance between the legitimate and traditional interest which the State has in
creating and defining the property interest of its citizens, and the necessity for a
uniform administration of the federal revenue statutes." Aquilino, 363 U.S. at 514.
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lien also embraces the taxpayer's "rights to property." 136  Accord-
ingly, the tax lien attaches to causes of action that the taxpayer might
have against a third party, even if those causes of action have not yet
been reduced to judgment. 137 Similarly, the lien embraces life es-
tates, future interests, joint tenancy property, and tenancies in com-
mon property. 138 Because the lien embraces a taxpayer's rights to
property, it has been held to attach to after-acquired property (prop-
erty acquired after the lien arises). 139
In addition, lower courts have established that, although state law is determinative
of a taxpayer's property rights, it is federal law that establishes whether a taxpayer
can renounce those property rights for tax lien purposes. See, e.g., In re Adler, 869
F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
136 See I.R.C. § 6321 (1994). A recent Supreme Court decision addressed
whether a taxpayer's rights under state law rose to the level of "rights to property."
See Drye v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 474, 478 (1999). In Drye, the Court con-
cluded that the determination should be based on "'the breadth of the control the
[taxpayer] could exercise over the property."' Drye, 120 S. Ct. at 483 (quoting
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 83 (1940)). For an indepth discussion of
Drye, see Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax
Lien to Tenancy-By-the-Entireties Interests, 75 IND. L.J. 1163 (2000).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Stonehill, 83 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 992 (1996); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir. 1985).
138 See United States v. Grimm, 865 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (N.D. Ind. 1994); see
also United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1964). It should be
noted, however, the federal tax lien does not apply to tenancies by the entirety
unless both the husband and wife are jointly liable for the tax lien, in which case it
attaches to the entire interest of both parties. See Tony Thorton Auction Serv., Inc.
v. United States, 791 F.2d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1986); Whittaker v. Kavanagh, 100 F.
Supp. 918, 920 (E.D. Mich. 1951). For a more complete discussion of the tenancy
by the entireties issue, see Cecil, supra note 106, at 158-65 n.37.
139 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1 (as amended in 1978); see also Glass City
Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267-68 (1945); State Bank of Fraser v. United
States, 861 F.2d 954, 963 (6th Cir. 1988). The lien also embraces the taxpayer's
property even if it is in the hands of a third person. In fact, after receiving actual
notice of the tax lien, the third person can be liable for conversion if he takes any
action that might impair the government's interest in the property. See United
States v. Allen, 207 F. Supp. 545, 546-47 (E.D. Wash. 1962). Moreover, property
subject to a federal income tax lien remains encumbered by the lien even after it is
transferred to a third party, such as a purchaser. See United States v. Bess, 357
U.S. 51, 57 (1958).
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Finally; and most importantly for purposes of this article, the
federal tax lien embraces property of the taxpayer that is exempt
from levy by creditors under either state or federal law. 140 Thus, in
United States v. Bess,14 1 the Supreme Court held that the lien at-
tached to the cash surrender value in a taxpayer's life insurance pol-
icy, despite the fact that the surrender value was exempt property
under New Jersey law, outside the reach of creditors. 14  Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit found that the federal tax lien overrode the tax-
payer's homestead exemption under state law, 143 and a number of
other courts have held that the federal tax lien also overrides state
wage exemptions; accordingly, the tax lien embraces a taxpayer's full
wages.144 There are a meager set of federal exemptions provided by
the Tax Code, such as school books and wearing apparel, which are
exempt from levy and sale by the Service; however, the tax lien still
attaches to this exempt property. 1
45
The tax lien, once established, remains in effect until the tax-
payer satisfies the liability or the liability becomes unenforceable due
to the lapse of time. 146 The Service generally has ten years after it
has assessed a tax to begin collection proceedings against the tax-
payer. 147 The Service can toll or extend this ten-year limitations pe-
riod under certain circumstances, such as when the taxpayer is in
bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court controls the taxpayer's assets,
148
140 See Michael St. James, Federal Tax Liens-Making Bankruptcy Attractive
to Creditors, 46 Bus. LAW. 157, 158 (1990).
141 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
142 Id. at 57.
143 See United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 1960); see also
Pate v. United States, 949 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1991).
144 See Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1959); Beltran v. Cohen,
303 F. Supp. 889, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
145 See I.R.C. § 6334(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a more complete discus-
sion of the difference between a tax lien and levy, see Cecil, supra note 106, at
158-58 to 158-63.
146 See I.R.C. § 6322 (1994).
147 See I.R.C. § 6502(a) (1994). The Tax Code provides that collection pro-
ceedings can be commenced either by initiating a proceeding in court or by levying
upon the taxpayer's property. Id.
See I.R.C. § 6503(b) (1994) (the statute is tolled for the duration of the pe-
riod when the assets are controlled by the court and for six months thereafter).
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or while the taxpayer is outside the United States for at least six
months. 1
49
B. Priority of the Tax Lien
Generally the "first in time, first in right" doctrine is used in
determining whether a federal tax lien has priority over other compet-
ing liens. 15  Accordingly, a federal tax lien that arises first in time
will take priority over any subsequent liens.
As with every tax rule, however, there are several exceptions
to the "first in time, first in right" doctrine. First, certain types of
liens that arise after the federal tax lien can prevail over it unless the
tax lien is properly filed before the subsequent lien arises. 151 There
are strict statutory requirements that the Service must follow in order
to file its tax lien properly. For example, notice of the tax lien must
be filed in a specifically-designated office in the state in which real
property is located. 152 For personalty, the Service must file its notice
of tax lien in a designated office located in the taxpayer's state of
residence.153  A properly filed tax lien is effective for ten years and
thirty days after the tax has been assessed.
154
149 See I.R.C. § 6503(c) (1994). Section 6503 establishes a comprehensive list
of circumstances under which the ten-year limitations period will be suspended by
the court. See I.R.C. § 6503 (1994).
150 See United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993). Courts have held,
however, that although federal law determines which liens are first in time, state
common law should be used by the federal courts in determining the status of liens
created in that state. See, e.g., Progressive Consumers Fed. Credit Union v. United
States, 79 F.3d 1228, 1235 (1st Cir. 1996).
151 See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1994); see also Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238,
257 (1978); Ellenberg v. J.M. Tull Metals (In re McTyre Grading & Pipe, Inc.),
193 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996). If the government files its tax lien
within the Bankruptcy Code's 90-day preference period, this lien perfection cannot
be undone by the bankruptcy trustee as a preferential transfer because perfection of
a statutory lien falls within one of the exceptions to the preference rules. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1994); see also McNaught v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re
Rogers Refrigeration, Inc.), 33 B.R. 59, 60 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1983).
152 See I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(ii), (2)(A) (1994).
153 See I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(ii), (2)(B) (1994). It is important to note that
once the notice of tax lien has been filed, it continues in effect even if the taxpayer
changes his state of residence. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-l(e) Example (1)
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The four categories of interests that will prevail over a prior
unfiled tax lien are those of purchasers, mechanic's lien holders,
holders of security interests, and judgment lien creditors. 155  For
purposes of this article, only the latter two categories of interests
might be applicable to a spouse holding a claim for unpaid alimony
or support. For example, as a part of a divorce agreement, a wife
may voluntarily grant her husband a security interest in certain of her
property to secure the promise to pay future alimony or support. Un-
der such an agreement, the husband would be the holder of a security
interest and could prevail over a prior unfiled tax lien in bankruptcy.
Similarly, if a wife agrees to pay a husband alimony or support as
part of the couple's divorce agreement, and fails to do so, the hus-
band could make a claim in a court of competent jurisdiction against
the wife for unpaid alimony or support. A judgment rendered by the
court against the wife generally gives rise to a judgment lien in favor
of the husband under state law. Accordingly, the husband would be-
come a judgment lien creditor and could defeat a prior unfiled tax
lien in a priority dispute. 156 Thus, unless a spouse holding an unpaid
alimony or support claim in the other spouse's bankruptcy can estab-
lish himself as a judgment lien creditor or the holder of a security
interest, then a prior tax lien will take priority over his interest and he
will be able to satisfy his claim only out of property remaining after
-the tax lien has been satisfied.
(1994). For a more detailed discussion of the rules governing how a tax lien is
properly filed, see Cecil supra note 106, at 158-68 to 158-7 1
154 See I.R.C. § 6323(g)(3)(A) (1994).
155 See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1994). The Code defines a purchaser as a person
acquiring a property interest for full and adequate consideration, but only if that
interest is valid against later purchasers under local law. See I.R.C. § 6323(h)(6)
(1994). A mechanic's lien arises with respect to real property when labor, services,
and/or materials are furnished to construct or improve that property. See I.R.C. §
6323(h)(2) (1994).
156 Regulations define a judgment lien creditor as "a person who has obtained a
valid judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery
of specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money." Treas. Reg. §
301.6323(h)-l(g) (1976). A judgment lien will only defeat a prior unfiled tax lien
if the amount of the lien, the property subject to it, and the lienor's identity can be
established. See United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 214 (1955).
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The second broad exception to the "first in time, first in right"
principle is the judicially-created choateness doctrine. First espoused
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank,157 the doctrine provides that even if a private lien is perfected,
it will not take priority over a subsequent tax lien unless the private
lien is choate. 158 A lien is deemed to be choate only if the lienor's
identity, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien
can be established with reasonable accuracy. 159
The choateness doctrine is generally effective to defeat a lien
on after-acquired property. 16  The seminal Supreme Court applying
the choatness doctrine vividly illustrates its application to defeat liens
on after-acquired property. In United States v. McDernott,16 1 the
government assessed an income tax deficiency against the taxpayers
in 1986 and, at the time of assessment, a tax lien was created in favor
of the government on all of the taxpayer's property, including prop-
erty acquired after the lien arose. A year later, in 1987, a bank re-
ceived a judgment against the taxpayers and, in accordance with state
law, obtained a judgment lien on their real property located in the
county rendering the judgment, including the taxpayer's after-
157 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
158 Id.; see also Dugan v. Missouri Neon & Plastic Adver. Co., 472 F.2d 944,
951 (8th Cir. 1973). There was an issue as to whether the choateness doctrine sur-
vived after Congress added § 6323 (a) to the Code when it enacted the Tax Lien
Act of 1966. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Texas Thermal Indus., Inc., 591 F.2d
1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court resolved the issue in 1993, when it
held that the choateness doctrine indeed survived the Tax Lien Act of 1966. See
United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449-50 (1993).
159 See United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 89 (1963); United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954). For a more complete discus-
sion of how courts have defined the judicially-created choateness doctrine, see
Cecil, supra note 106, at 158-76 to 158-77.
160 See, e.g., Rice Inv. Co. v. United States, 625 F.2d 565, 572 (5th Cir. 1980).
The doctrine can also operate to defeat a lien securing the repayment of future dis-
bursements or advances by a creditor. See, e.g., United States v. R. F. Ball Constr.
Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 587, 587 (1958). This type of lien, however, is not likely to
arise in a situation involving support claims of a spouse or child of the debtor and,
therefore, will not be addressed in this article. An indepth discussion of the cases
applying the choateness doctrine can be found in Cecil, supra note 106, at 158-77
to 158-80.
161 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
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acquired property. Several months after the bank's judgment was
rendered, the government filed its notice of tax lien. Thereafter, the
taxpayers acquired real property in the county of the bank's judg-
ment, and the issue arose as to whether the bank or the government
was entitled to priority with respect to their liens against that prop-
erty. The Supreme Court first held that, because the bank had ac-
quired the status of judgment lien creditor when the lower court is-
sued its judgment and created a judgment lien, the federal tax lien
would only have priority over the bank's judgment lien after the gov-
ernment filed the notice of tax lien pursuant to section 6323(a) of the
Code. 16 2 The Court then held, however, that the federal tax lien was
entitled to priority over the judgment lien because the judgment lien
was held to be inchoate until the taxpayers acquired the real property
to which the lien attached, and that acquisition occurred after the tax
lien was properly filed. 163 Accordingly, under the choateness doc-
trine, a private lien remains inchoate until property subject to the lien
is acquired, while a tax lien receives priority when it is filed.164
Thus, assume that a spouse acquires a judgment lien against
the debtor to secure the enforcement of unpaid alimony, mainte-
nance, or support, and the state in which the judgment is rendered
grants the spouse a judgment lien on the debtor's real property lo-
cated in the county of judgment (a common state statutory provision).
If the government files its income tax lien thereafter, the tax lien will
have priority over the spouse's judgment lien to the extent that the
debtor acquires real property after the tax lien is filed, pursuant to the
choateness doctrine. Conversely, if a spouse acquires a judgment
lien against the debtor, then property is acquired by the debtor, and
thereafter the government files its tax lien, the judgment lien will take
priority over the tax lien because it will be deemed to be choate when
the debtor later acquires the property, which occurs prior to the filing
of the tax lien. 165 In sum, the judicially-created choateness doctrine
162 Id. at 449
163 Id. at 455.
164 Id. at 449, 451-52 n.4; see also Ellenberg v. J. M. Tull Metals (In re
McTyre Grading & Pipe, Inc.), 193 B.R. 983, 991 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
165 Although the choateness doctrine is a judicially-established doctrine, there
are two statutory exceptions to its application. The first, which applies only to
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gives a special priority to the government's income tax liens, even
when competing liens arise first in time and would otherwise be
granted priority over the tax lien. As the following section amply
illustrates, the choateness doctrine is but one of the powerful tools
available to the government in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding to
defeat the legitimate interests of the debtor's spouse and children.
1V. THE TENSION BETWEEN TAx AND SUPPORT CLAIMS IN
BANKRUPTCY: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Empirical studies have estimated that nearly twenty-five per-
cent of individual debtors seeking bankruptcy protection identify
family problems, such as obligations to pay support, as a cause of
their bankruptcy. 166 Yet despite the fact that there are a significant
number of creditors holding support claims that must compete with
federal income tax claims for limited assets in a debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding, no bankruptcy or tax scholar has attempted to examine
the tension between these two types of claims in bankruptcy. This
undertaking becomes especially important in light of the massive
changes to the treatment of both federal income tax claims and sup-
port claims resulting from the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
Thus, the section that follows will attempt to explore this uncertain
interplay between both unsecured and secured tax and support claims
under the Bankruptcy Code, with particular emphasis on the complex
future advances clauses, provides that if a security interest is properly perfected
before the filing of a tax lien, any advances made by the creditor under the security
agreement within 45 days after the filing of the tax lien will be protected by the
security interest and will defeat the lien. See I.R.C.§ 6323(d) (1994). Because
family law agreements do not usually contain future advances clauses, this statu-
tory exception is irrelevant in the case of most, if not all, support claims. The sec-
ond statutory exception, applicable to after-acquired property clauses as well as
future advances clauses, gives special protection to security interests arising out of
certain commercial financing transactions. See I.R.C. § 6323(c) (1994). Again,
because support agreements are not considered commercial financing transactions,
this statutory exception will also be inapplicable for purposes of this article.
166 See Sullivan et al., supra note 30, at 16, 181-82; see also S. Rep. No. 106-
49, at 9 (1999) (suggesting that "more than one-third of bankruptcies involve
spousal and child support orders.").
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interrelationship and inherent conflict between these two types of
claims occasioned by the 1994 Act.
A. Harmonizing the Priority Rules in Bankruptcy
The interplay between tax and support claims in an individual
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code's prior-
ity rules will depend upon three unrelated factors: (1) whether the
debtor has filed a chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petition; (2)
whether the government's tax claims against the debtor are secured
or unsecured; and (3) whether the debtor's support claims are secured
or unsecured. Table 1 below illustrates that there are four possible
combinations of unsecured and secured tax and support claims in
bankruptcy. The Table summarizes the treatment of such claims un-
der the bankruptcy priority rules in both chapter 7 and chapter 13
proceedings, and then each of these four possible permutations is
considered separately in the discussion that follows.
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TABLE 1167
SUMMARY OF PRIORITY RULES
TYPE OF CLAIMS CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 13
Support Claim Both paid in full (with Both paid in full (with
Secured/ interest only if claims interest) under
Tax Claim Secured 168  are oversecured) under §1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
§ 506(a)
Support Claim Support paid in full Support paid in full
Secured/ under § 506(a); taxes (with interest) under
Tax Claim given eighth priority § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii);
Unsecured 69  under § 507(a)(8) taxes paid in full(without interest)
under § 1322(a)(2)
Support Claim Support paid as a sev- Both paid in full
Unsecured/ enth priority unse- (without interest)
Tax Claim cured claim; taxes under § 1322(a)(2)
Unsecured 170  paid as an eight prior-
ity claim only after
support is paid in full
under
§ 507(a)(7)(8)
Support Claim Unse- Support claim paid as Support paid in full
cured/ a seventh priority un- (without interest)
Tax Claim Secured 171  secured claim, reduc- under § 1322(a)(2);
ing tax claim to unse- taxes paid in full (with
cured status under § interest) under
.724 §1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
167 This Table assumes that tax claims are nondischargeable as federal income
tax claims under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1) (1994), and are entitled to an eighth priority
in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994). It further assumes that
support claims are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and are there-
fore nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §. 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) and
entitled to seventh priority in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1994).
168 For a complete discussion of this category of claim, see infra notes 172-75
and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
170 This category of claimants is discussed infra notes 180-83 and accompany-
ing text.
171 See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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1. Both Support and Tax Claims Secured
In a bankruptcy proceeding, a creditor holding a valid security
interest is treated as having an allowed secured claim up to the value
of the collateral securing the indebtedness, and an unsecured claim to
* the extent that the outstanding indebtedness exceeds the value of the
collateral. 72 In a chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee will either provide
for full payment of all allowed secured claims, or, as is more often
the case, will abandon the secured property to the creditor, 173 and the
creditor will then satisfy its claim by selling the property. 174
Similarly, in a chapter 13 proceeding, although the debtor re-
tains all of his property in bankruptcy, including secured property,
the debtor's rehabilitation plan must provide for the full payment of
all allowed secured claims, together with interest on those claims,
over the life of the plan. 175 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did
172 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 506(a) (1994). This statement is premised on the
assumption that the security interest is not avoidable in bankruptcy. See, e.g., §§
522(f) (1994); 544 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), 547 (1994).
173 The concept of abandonment is addressed in 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
174 Although this treatment of secured claims is not expressly provided for in
the Bankruptcy Code, it is nevertheless a well established principle of bankruptcy
law. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 100, at 38-39.
In chapter 7, a creditor is also entitled to post-petition interest on its allowed
secured claim at the rate provided for in the contract creating the indebtedness, but
only up to the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994). For example,
assume that the debtor owes a creditor $5,000 on a loan secured by the debtor's
car, that the value of the car is $6,000, and that the contract between the debtor and
creditor provides for interest at 12% annually on the unpaid balance of the loan.
The creditor will have an allowed secured claim of $5,000, and is entitled to inter-
est at the contract rate of 1% per month on the $5,000 claim from the date of the
debtor's bankruptcy filing until the date that the claim is paid; however, interest
stops accruing after it reaches $1,000"
175 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1994). Moreover, the secured creditor
retains its lien on the property until it receives full payment under the plan. See 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) (1994). In the alternative, the debtor can surrender the
secured property to the creditor, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (1994), or the credi-
tor can agree to a payment of less than its allowed secured claim under the debtor's
plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (1994).
Courts are divided over the interest rate to which the creditor is entitled on
its secured claim over the life of the plan. Some courts have held that the existing
contract rate between the debtor and creditor is appropriate, see In re Smith, 4 B.R.
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nothing to alter this treatment of secured claims in either chapter 7 or
chapter 13 proceedings. Thus, both before and after the 1994 Act, if
both tax and support claims are secured, they will be satisfied in full
in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding irrespective of whether the
debtor files her petition under chapter 7 or chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
2. Support Claim Secured/Tax Claim Unsecured
As discussed above, if a support claimant has a fully secured
obligation in a debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the claim-
ant will be paid in full over the course of the proceeding, either by
the trustee or through the sale of the collateral after the trustee aban-
dons it to the secured creditor.176 Unsecured tax claims, on the other
hand, will not fare as well as secured support claims in a chapter 7
proceeding. As an eighth priority unsecured creditor, a tax claimant
will be paid out of property of the estate only after superior priority
12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); while others have opted for current market rate.
See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67-68 (3d Cir.
1993); see also Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick),
121 F.3d 211, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1997); Dominion Bank v. Cassell (In re Cassell),
119 B.R. 89, 93-94 (W.D. Va. 1990). Courts employing current market rate often
refer to it as a "coerced loan" rate, on the theory that the court is, in effect, requir-
ing the creditor to make a new loan to the debtor rather than repossessing the col-
lateral, selling it, and reinvesting the funds in a similar loan to another borrower.
See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d at 67-68. Still other
courts employ different interest rates, such as the treasury bill rate, together with a
premium thereon, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti),
105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997); In re DeMaggio, 175 B.R. 144, 151-52 (Bankr.
N.H. 1994); or the creditor's borrowing rate (often referred to as the cost of funds
rate). See, e.g., In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 192 (Bankr. N.J. 1991); In re Hudock,
124 B.R. 532, 534 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991). For a more comprehensive discussion
of this issue, see Matthew Y. Harris, Chapter 13 Cram Down Interest Rates: An-
other Day, Another Dollar-A Cry for Help in Ending the Quest for the Appropriate
Rate, 67 Miss. L.J. 567 (1997); Monica Hartman, Comment, Selecting the Correct
Cramdown Interest Rate in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 47 UCLA L.
Rev. 521 (1999); see also Fleet Finance, Inc. v. Ivey (In re Ivey), 147 B.R. 109
(M.D. N.C. 1992).
176 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 554 (1994); see also supra notes 172-74 and ac-
companying text.
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claims, such as administrative expenses and unsecured support
claims, are paid in full.
177
In a chapter 13 proceeding, the debtor must provide for full
payment of secured support claims, together with interest on those
claims, over the life of his rehabilitation plan. 178 Similarly, because
tax claims will be priority claims in a debtor's chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding, the debtor must also provide for full payment of those
tax claims over the life of the plan, but without any provision for in-
terest on those claims. 179 Accordingly, it is clear that, when a support
claim is secured and a tax claim is unsecured in a debtor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding, the support claim will receive preferential treat-
ment for priority purposes irrespective of whether the proceeding is
in chapter 7 or chapter 13.
3. Both Support & Tax Claims Unsecured
Under chapter 7, recall that support claims were granted a
seventh priority under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, relegat-
ing federal income tax claims to eighth priority status. 18  Thus, in
accordance with congressional intent in passing the 1994 Act, unse-
cured support claimants will be paid in full before unsecured federal
income tax claims receive anything in a debtor's chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy proceeding, but only if the debtor has any property remaining
in his bankruptcy estate to satisfy the claims of unsecured priority
creditors after paying secured creditors in full. As will be discussed
in section B, however, empirical studies have indicated that the vast
majority of debtors have no assets to pay any unsecured creditors at
177 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (1994); see also supra notes 102-06 and accom-
panying text.
178 For a more complete discussion of this concept, see supra note 175 and
accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
179 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1994); see also Csontos et al., supra note 110,
at 287 ("[T]here is no discount factor provided for priority taxes paid over time in
Chapter 13, unlike Chapter 11. There is no explanation in the legislative history for
this. This is inequitable.") (footnotes omitted) (remarks of the Honorable Polly
Higdon).
180 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108
Stat. 4106, 4132-33 (1994); see also supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
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all in their individual bankruptcy proceedings; thus, support claim-
ants' higher priority status in bankruptcy often results in little real
benefit to them.
81
In a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, all priority claims
must be paid in full over the life of the debtor's rehabilitation plan.
182
Thus, because both support and tax claims are granted priority status
under the Bankruptcy Code, the fact that support claims have a
higher priority status than federal income tax claims is irrelevant,
because both claims must be 1p aid in full over the course of the
debtor's chapter 13 proceeding.'
4. Support Claim Unsecured/Tax Claim Secured
Even if a tax claim is secured and a support claim is unse-
cured in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, there are special priority
rules in chapter 7 that will allow the unsecured support claim to be
treated as superior to the secured tax claim. Under section 724 of the
Bankruptcy Code, any priority claim that is superior to the priority
afforded unsecured tax claims will defeat the tax lien.' 84 Because
181 See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
182 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (1994).
183 It should be noted that, because taxes are granted priority status and, there-
fore, must be paid in full over the life of a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, they are not
granted nondischargeability status under 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1994). Yet support
claims, which are also granted priority status and must be paid in full over the life
of the debtor's chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, are also listed as nondischargeable
debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1994). It appears that this is merely a
technical drafting error, likely caused by the haste with which the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994 was passed. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
Thus, because support claims are now granted priority status and will be fully paid
over the life of the debtor's rehabilitation plan, they should not be included as non-
dischargeable debts under § 1328.
184 See 11 U.S.C. §724(b) (1994). This provision has been widely criticized
by, and was the subject of extended debate by, the Tax Advisory Committee to the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, a committee formed in February, 1997
to consider proposed measures to reform the tax provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code. See Williams, supra note 110, at 42. The Tax Advisory Committee recom-
mended the repeal of § 724(b), but that recommendation was not adopted by the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission. See id. at 42-44; see also Robin E.
Phelan et al., A Sample of Key Tax Issues Being Considered (or Which Should be
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support claims are now afforded a seventh priority in bankruptcy,
they can trump the federal tax lien in full. Accordingly, by granting
support claims a seventh priority, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 positioned support claims ahead of tax claims in a chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding, irrespective of whether the tax claim is se-
cured or unsecured.
185
Unlike chapter 7, however, chapter 13 contains no special
provision granting unsecured support claims priority over secured tax
claims in bankruptcy. Accordingly, secured tax claims are treated
like any other secured claim, and therefore the claims must be paid
in full over the life of the debtor's rehabilitation plan.186 Yet even
though chapter 13 contains no special rules elevating unsecured sup-
port claims above secured tax claims, because priority claims must be
paid in full over the life of the debtor's chapter 13 rehabilitation plan,
support claims will be treated much like secured tax claims in the
chapter 13 plan, as the debtor must provide for full payment of such
claims in the plan.
187
Considered) by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Norton Bankr. Law
Adviser, Apr. 1994, at 1, 4-5.
185 Unlike the preferential treatment afforded support claims in chapter 7, there
are no provisions in chapter 11 allowing unsecured support claims to trump secured
tax claims in a debtor's chapter 11 proceeding. Because tax liens are treated like
any other secured claim in chapter 11, courts will resort to the priority rules for tax
liens discussed in Part III, supra. Accordingly, a secured tax claim will defeat an
unsecured support claim in chapter 11. Moreover, even if the support claim is
secured, the tax lien may still be granted priority treatment if it arose first in time or
if the support claim is deemed inchoate. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying
text. This tension rarely arises, however, because few individual debtors avail
themselves of chapter I l's more expensive and time consuming bankruptcy provi-
sions. But see Warren & Westbrook, supra note 64, at 501.
186 See 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1994). As discussed supra note 175 and
accompanying text, the Bankruptcy Code does provide that the debtor can pay less
than the full amount of the secured claim if the holder of the claim accepts the
debtor's plan. See 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(5)(A) (1994).
187 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. The primary difference
between the treatment of secured tax claims and unsecured support claims under a
chapter 13 plan is that secured claims are entitled to interest over the life of the
plan, while priority claims are not. See 11 U.S.C. §§1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
(1994).
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The foregoing discussion illustrates that, if a debtor files a
chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, creditors holding both tax and sup-
port claims will be paid in full in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding,
irrespective of whether they hold secured or unsecured claims. Be-
cause Congress has greatly expanded the list of priority claims in
bankruptcy, however, a debtor must pay many more claims in full
over the life of her rehabilitation plan. Accordingly, it is likely that
debtors will find it more difficult to comply with the requirements for
chapter 13 as a result of the changes made by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994.188
The examples above also demonstrate that, although there
will rarely be any significant difference between the treatment of tax
and support claims in chapter 13, creditors holding support claims in
chapter 7 will always fare at least as well, for priority purposes, as
tax claimants as a result of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.189
Of course, this result is not surprising given that one of the primary
congressional goals in enacting the 1994 Act was to elevate support
obligations above tax claims in bankruptcy. 190  What is surprising,
however, is that one unrelated and seemingly insignificant provision
enacted by Congress in the same legislation utterly defeats this laud-
able goal. The section that follows will explain how this unintended
result was permitted to occur.
188 See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 30, at 180; Robert J. Kerwin & Joseph
S.U. Bodoff, Changes Resulting From the 1994 Act, Mass. Law. Wkly., Oct. 31,
1994, at A 1l.
189 Thus, the remainder of this article will concentrate on chapter 7, rather than
chapter 13, bankruptcies. This concentration on chapter 7 proceedings is amply
warranted, however, because less than 30% of consumer bankruptcies are governed
by chapter 13. See Mark Jickling, CRS Report for Congress--One Million Personal
Bankruptcies a Year: Economic Implications and Policy Options 4 (1998). There-
fore, the vast majority of consumer bankruptcies are governed by chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. For an indepth discussion of the problems facing debtors who
convert their petitions from chapter 13 to chapter 7, see Robert J. Volpi, Comment,
Property of the Bankruptcy Estate After a Conversion From Chapter 13 to Chapter
7: The Need for a Definite Answer, 68 Ind. L.J. 489 (1993).
190 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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B. Problems Inherent in the Bankruptcy Code's Nondischargeability
Rules
A massive empirical study of the causes and effects of con-
sumer bankruptcy has concluded that nearly ninety percent of all
chapter 7 consumer debtors are "no asset" debtors, meaning that they
have no assets remaining in their bankruptcy estates after satisfying
secured claims and taking their allowable bankruptcy exemptions.
Thus, in the vast majority of consumer bankruptcy cases, unsecured
creditors, including priority creditors, receive nothing in debtors'
bankruptcy proceedings. 19  In these cases, the only hope that unse-
cured creditors have for receiving any payment on their claims is to
have them classified as nondischargeable debts under section 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
Recall that both tax and support claims are generally nondis-
chargeable in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding;' moreover, both
types of claims also enjoy a special nondischargeability status be-
cause the claimants can proceed against the debtor's exempt property
in order to satisfy their claims. 194  Inasmuch as tax and support
claims occupy equal status under the Bankruptcy Code, the priority
rules for such claims outside bankruptcy become critical. And herein
191 See Sullivan et al., supra note 45, at 203. The study demonstrates that over
90% of homeowners in chapter 7 are "no asset" debtors, and that over 87% of non-
homeowners in chapter 7 are "no asset" debtors. See id. at 205. For an indepth
critique of this empirical study, see Gross, supra note 60, at 1506 passim.
Other studies confirm this 90% figure. See ,e.g., Irving A. Breitowitz, New
Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of
"Substantial Abuse," 59 Am. Bankr. L.J. 327, 335 (pt. 1 1985) ("[F]or all practical
purposes, the priority and distribution provisions of chapter 7 are virtually dead
letter since, in over 90% of all cases, there are no assets available for distribution
after exemptions are claimed.") (footnotes omitted). Another study found that over
92% of chapter 7 proceedings were "no asset" cases. See Michael J. Herbert &
Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of
Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 303, 311 (1988)"
192 See Sullivan et al., supra note 30, at 180 (in most cases the priority provi-
sion "gives the ex-spouse and children first crack at an empty box.").
193 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text
194 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1994).
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lies the rub. Because the federal government can convert its claim
from unsecured to secured status (as to the debtor's exempt property
and property acquired post-petition) 195 during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding without violating the automatic stay pursuant to section
362(b)(9)(D) of the Bankruptcy Code, 19 6 it will have priority over
unsecured support claims with respect to the debtor's exempt and
post-petition property. Because this property offers the best hope for
support creditors to satisfy their nondischargeable claims, and inas-
much as these claims rarely get satisfied out of property of the es-
tate, 197 the provision allowing the federal government to convert its
status to that of a secured creditor without violating the stay ulti-
mately places the government ahead of support claimants. This pref-
erential position afforded governmental tax claims directly contra-
venes one of the express policy underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994 of protecting support claimants in a debtor's bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 198 Moreover, because tax claims are often quite
large, in part due to accrued interest and penalties,' 99 it is likely that
there will be no exempt or post-petition property remaining to satisfy
support creditors' claims after taxes are satisfied in full. The section
that follows attempts to remedy this significant problem.
195 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(D) (1994).
196 As discussed supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text, as a result of
amendments made to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
the government can assess a tax and issue a notice and demand for payment to the
debtor without violating the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9)(D) (1994).
Because assessment, notice and demand, and a ten-day waiting period are the only
steps necessary to create a tax lien on the debtor's property, the government can
convert its position from unsecured to secured status during the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding without violating the stay. Although the statute provides that the tax lien
does not attach to property of the estate, the lien nevertheless attaches to the
debtor's exempt and post-petition property, which is the property that the govern-
ment and support claimants will use to satisfy their nondischargeable debts.
197 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
198 For a more complete discussion of these policies, see supra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text.
199 For a comprehensive discussion of the Internal Revenue Code's interest and
penalty provisions, see Saltzman, supra note 133, 6.01-7B.20.
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C. A Proposal for Protecting Spouses and Children in Bankruptcy
Most bankruptcy scholars agree that the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994 is an extreme example of the legislative process gone
awry.200 Not only did the House fail to hold a single hearing on the
Act, but no conference committee was ever formed to resolve differ-
ences between the House and Senate versions of the bankruptcy re-
form legislation, and rules were continually ignored during the legis-
lative process in an effort to pass the Act before the end of the con-
gressional session.
20 1
What is clear from the legislative history of the Act is that one
of the main goals that the legislators were attempting to further in the
Act was to protect alimony, maintenance, and child support claimants
in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.2 °2
H. R. 5116 gives added protection to child support and ali-
mony payments in the event of a bankruptcy filing .... It is incom-
prehensible that while many creditors can collect their fees, depend-
ents, spouses and children have to wait and may never be included.
H.R.5116 elevates child support from its current status as a general,
unsecured debt to a formally prioritized debt. This important change
will help insure that a custodial parent will not have to wait years to
receive payment due . . . I have heard heartbreaking stories from
single parents who want nothing but the best for their children, but
find themselves forced to fight for their rightful level of child sup-
port. With no other recourse, these families often turn to welfare to
provide the child support the absent parent ought to be responsible
for. H.R. 5116 takes an important first step in breaking this tragic
cycle by strengthening current bankruptcy law and enforcing tougher
measures for child support and alimony collection. 203
Yet while Congress evidenced its strong intention to elevate
support claims above tax claims in bankruptcy by giving them a
200 See, e.g., Falk, supra note 11, at 103.
201 For a more comprehensive discussion of the history of the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see supranotes 13-25 and accompanying text
202 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
203 140 Cong. Rec. H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Slaugh-
ter).
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higher priority in the payment scheme, at the same time it passed a
seemingly minor provision that will have the ultimate effect, in most
instances, of placing federal tax claims ahead of support claims
where it really matters: with respect to the debtor's exempt and post-
petition property. Balancing the stated purpose behind Section
362(b)(9)(D), affording administrative ease to the Service in assess-
ing taxes, against its unintended consequence of undermining one of
the principal policies of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, there is
no alternative but that the provision be repealed in its entirety.
204
Critics of this proposal might attempt to assert three argu-
ments to defeat it. First, they could argue that, because the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits support claims to be modified during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding without violating the automatic stay, 2°unsecured
support claimants have the same opportunity as the government to
convert their claims from unsecured to secured status during the
debtor's bankruptcy proceedings without running afoul of the stay.
The response to this argument is twofold. First, there is no case law
to support the contention that the automatic stay exception allowing
for the "establishment or modification of an order for alimony, main-
tenance , or support ' 2° 6 is broad enough to permit the creation of a
lien on the debtor's property as part of the court's establishment or
modification order. Yet even if one assumes that this modification
exception is broad enough to permit a support creditor to convert
from unsecured to secured status without violating the stay, domestic
proceedings take a significantly longer period of time to complete
than the procedures necessary to assess a tax and establish a lien on
the debtor's property. Thus, it would become a race of the creditors
204 This article assumes that the result of moving tax claims ahead of support
claims in bankruptcy was an unintended consequence of a hurried legislative proc-
ess. If, on the other hand, the provision was carefully crafted by the Service and
foisted upon unwitting legislators, the Internal Revenue Service deserves far more
credit for its intelligence than society gives it currently.
205 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994); see also supra notes 99-100 and
accompanying text.
206 See id.
207 In fact, at least one bankruptcy treatise expressly states that this exception is
not broad enough to allow for enforcement of the order. See 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 362.05[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2000).
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to determine which creditor establishes its lien first. Such a race
would be the antithesis of the bankruptcy policy that promotes fair
and equitable distribution of the debtor's assets to all creditors.
20 8
Moreover, even if the support claimants are able to obtain
their liens against the debtor's property first, and therefore would
generally defeat the later tax lien under the "first in time, first in
right" doctrine,209 the tax lien might nevertheless have priority over
the support liens to the extent that the support liens are deemed in-
choate. Recall that, for tax lien priority purposes, a lien is deemed
inchoate until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien, and the amount of the lien can all be established with reasonable
accuracy. 2 1  Accordingly, a later-in-time tax lien will defeat an ear-
lier support lien to the extent that the liens apply to property acquired
by the debtor after the liens arise (after-acquired property). 211
208 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 33 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3341; Report of the Comm'n on the Bankr. Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 76-79 (1973).
209 For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine, see supra notes 150-65 and
accompanying text.
210 See United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 89 (1963). For an
indepth examination of the judicially-created choateness doctrine, see Cecil, supra
note 106, at 158-76 to 158-77.
211 See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. It is important to note that,
to the extent that support liens are not deemed inchoate, they might be able to arise
subsequent to the tax lien and still defeat the tax lien if (1) the tax lien cannot be
filed during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding because such filing would
violate the automatic stay; and (2) the support liens are deemed to be judgment
liens under I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1994). For a more comprehensive discussion of the
priority afforded judgment liens over unfiled tax liens, see supra notes 155-56 and
accompanying text; see also Cecil, supra note 106, at 158-72 to 158-76.
If a support lien takes priority over a tax lien because of the support claim-
ant's status as judgment lien creditor, the support lien cannot be avoided by the
debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) (1994), because one of the changes
made by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was the addition of a provision stat-
ing that a debtor cannot avoid a judicial lien to the extent that the lien secures a
debt for alimony, maintenance, or support. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
This provision is the statutory codification of the Supreme Court's decision in Far-
rey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991). See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363. It is important to note that, like the
Bankruptcy Code's priority and nondischargeability provisions, this exception to
the lien avoidance rules creates a strict distinction between support claimants, who
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The second criticism that might be waged against this arti-
cle's proposal is that, because support claims can be collected against
property not property of the estate without violating the automatic
stay,2 12 these claims can proceed against the debtor's exempt prop-
erty even during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. Ac-
cordingly, critics will argue that these claims will be satisfied before
the government's tax claim, despite the government's ability to create
a tax lien without violating the automatic stay.
2 13
This criticism fails to recognize the important distinction be-
tween secured and unsecured claims under non-bankruptcy priority
rules. For example, to the extent that the support claims are unse-
cured claims, then even if the support creditors levy against the
debtor's exempt and post-petition property during the bankruptcy
proceeding, the government will nevertheless defeat their support
claims if the government's tax lien has already been created and at-
tached to the debtor's property. Thus, there is a small window of
opportunity when support claimants can proceed against the debtor's
unencumbered exempt and post-petition property, before the Service
has assessed its tax and sent a notice and demand for payment
214(thereby creating its tax lien). Yet even this small window of op-
can avail themselves of the exception, and creditors holding property settlement
claims, who cannot. For a discussion of this distinction, see White, supra note 84,
at 626. This lien avoidance provision is not applicable, however, in cases in which
the support claims are assigned to another entity, either voluntarily or by operation
of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
212 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (1994); see also supra notes 96-98 and ac-
companying text.
213 Although there are several lower court decisions holding that the automatic
stay exception enunciated in § 362(b)(2)(B) applies equally to support creditors'
pre- and post-petition claims, see In re Cole, 202 B.R. 356, 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996); Rogers v. Overstreet (In re Rogers), 164 B.R. 382, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1994), this conclusion is certainly not free from doubt. Generally, even if creditors
hold debts that will be nondischargeable in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, they
are nonetheless required to wait until the end of the bankruptcy proceeding before
attempting to enforce their claims against the debtor's post-petition property. Thus,
it is arguable that only post-petition support claimants can collect their claims
against the debtor's exempt and post-petition property during the pendency of the
case without violating the automatic stay.
214 See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text for a more complete discus-
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portunity might evaporate if support claimants are required to wait
until the debtor's exempt property is determined by the court before
they levy on that property, because the exemption process is often not
completed until well into the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.
215
The final argument that might be posited against this article's
proposal is that, at least with respect to child support obligations, the
Child Support Enforcement Act of 1984 requires states to enact laws
providing that liens will arise automatically when a debtor fails to
make court-ordered child support payments on a timely basis.216 The
sion of the method by which the government creates a tax lien against the debtor's
property"
Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the exemption process
can take two months or more to complete. The filing of the debtor's petition com-
mences the case, and commencement constitutes the order for relief. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1994). The debtor's exemption schedule must be filed with the court within
15 days after the filing of the petition. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c). If the debtor
fails to claim exemptions or to file the appropriate schedules, a dependent of the
debtor may file a list of exemptions within 30 days after the debtor's time limita-
tion has passed. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994).
The United States trustee must call a meeting of the creditors to be held no fewer
than 20 days and no greater than 40 days after the order for relief. See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2003(a). If any creditor (or the bankruptcy trustee) has an objection to the
exemptions claimed by the debtor or the debtor's dependent, these objections must
be received within 30 days after the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b). Finally, if no objections are received within this 30-
day period, the property automatically revests in the debtor as exempt property.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1) (1994). "Most courts have held that exemptions are final-
ized at the time that an objection to the exemption may no longer be filed." Henry
J. Sommer & The Honorable Margaret D. McGarity, Collier Family Law and the
Bankruptcy Code 5-37 (Lawrence P. King ed., 1995). Thus, the government has a
significant amount of time during the bankruptcy proceeding to assess its tax
against the debtor and establish a lien on the debtor's property before any property
revests in the debtor as exempt property, thereby allowing the support claimants to
proceed against it without violating the estate. Accordingly, any window of
opportunity that support claimants might have in theory to levy on the debtor's
property to satisfy their claims before the tax lien arises is unlikely to be available
in practice.
216 Child Support Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 3, 98 Stat.
1305, 1306-07 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998))"
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liens must attach to both real and personal property of the debtor.217
Accordingly, critics might argue that the issues raised in this article
are remote because unpaid child support obligations give rise to im-
mediate liens under state law, and these liens would defeat subse-
quent tax liens under the "first in time, first in right" doctrine. 2 18
In response to this criticism, recall that liens arising from un-
paid child support obligations are, by definition, inchoate with re-
spect to property that the debtor acquires after the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, 2 19 and thus can be defeated by a tax lien created dur-
ing the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 220  Moreover, al-
though no case has yet addressed this issue, it is certainly arguable
that the same reasoning would apply to defeat the child support lien
with respect to the debtor's exempt property, because exempt prop-
erty does not revest in the debtor (and thus is not acquired by him)
until after the bankruptcy proceeding begins. 22 1 Thus, the child sup-
port lien is not deemed to arise under the choateness doctrine until
the debtor reacquires this exempt property in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Finally, the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1984 has no ap-
plication to alimony and maintenance claims; thus a large segment of
support claims receives no benefit whatsoever from the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Congress wanted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 to be known throughout history as "one of the most significant
pieces of economic legislation to be considered by the House in [the
217 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4)(A) (1994); see also Homer H. Clark, Jr., The
Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 736 (2d ed. 1988).
218 See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text for a detailed examination of
the "first in time, first in right" doctrine.
219 This is so because, under the choateness doctrine, the lien is not deemed to
arise until the debtor acquires the property. See supra notes 160-65 and accompa-
nying text.
220 To the extent that the lien attaches to property of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate, the child support obligations would be secured claims. See supra notes 172-
74 and accompanying text.
221 For a discussion of the timing of the exemption process, see supra note 215
and accompanying text.
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103d] Congress, ' 222 the Act's hallmarks are instead poor draftsman-
ship and an utter disregard for the legislative process. As a result of
significant procedural irregularities in the process, there is an inher-
ent conflict between the tax and support provisions of the Act. This
conflict undermines one of the Act's principal policy objectives: to
protect the alimony, maintenance, and child support claims of
spouses and children in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. Eliminat-
ing this conflict by repealing one of the federal government's special
interest provisions in the Bankruptcy Code will bring Congress one
step closer to achieving this laudable goal.
222 See 140 CONG. REc. H10764 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Brooks, sponsor of H.R. 5116).
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